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Abstract
This thesis is to address three questions on price competition and one question in statistical
application in physics that has a possible application in economics. The aim of the first
paper is to investigate the equilibrium in a dynamic Bertrand duopoly where firms do not
know the cost of other firms and firms face an avoidable sunk cost when they decide to
enter the market. In this model, firms are allowed to monitor rival’s entry decision before
making their pricing decision. Firms are also allowed to communicate with each other via
announcements before they make the entry decision. I show that there exists two classes
of Pure-Strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in this game. In one class of equilibrium only
the low cost firms enter, and in the other class of equilibrium only one firm enters while
the other stays out irrespective of their types. This is a new existence result and the paper
provides full characterization of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). Communication
among firms is just ‘cheap talk’ and has no effect on the set of equilibria in this game.
One-shot price competition among identical firms facing avoidable fixed cost generally
leads to a permanent inefficiency when costs are unknown. This stems from the fact that
the market is not served with positive probabilities. However, in reality, firms interact
repeatedly. My second paper shows that market inefficiency in the one-shot game can be
restored with infinitely repeated interaction among competing firms. I demonstrate that
with infinite interaction of firms in a Bertrand setting, competing firms can self-impose
collusive conduct via communication. I provide a characterization of the Perfect Public
Equilibrium (PPE) where firms collude and as a part of this equilibrium firms employ
asymmetric penal codes. In this game, pre-play communication has a positive value which
is absent in the one-shot game. The results indicate that the presence of an avoidable
fixed cost in this setting makes it easier for firms to collude.
In the third paper, I consider a Bertrand duopoly where one firm’s cost is publicly
known and the other firm’s cost is private information. In this paper, we provide a full
characterization of the [?] of this game under equal market sharing rule. We point out
that one-sided cost uncertainty and bounded known cost type is sufficient to guarantee
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the existence of the PSBNE.
Finally, in the fourth paper we use basic techniques from econometrics and statistics,
in particular Ordinary Least Square regression and Pearson’s rank correlation method, to
study second order fluctuations along the fluid side of the melting line of the Lennard-
Jones (LJ). We use Molecular Dynamic computer simulation to generate data on the
cross correlation between the configurational part of the pressure and potential energy the
repulsive and attractive parts of the potential energy. By using the statistical techniques
we notice a qualitative change along the melting line.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A big part of this thesis analyzes Bertrand Competition when firms do not know each
other’s cost in different settings. In the second part, we analyze a statistical application
to predict second order fluctuations of temperature along the Lennard-Jones melting line
using different ensembles. The first part of my thesis has three chapters. The first chapter
is motivated by Baye and Kovenock (2008) and several others that establish that, under
equal market sharing rule, the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a standard full
information Bertrand game with avoidable fixed cost is difficult. Saporiti et al (2010)
show that an equilibrium with pure strategies is possible when cost functions of firms are
not sub-additive. However, when marginal costs are unknown and due to the fundamental
discontinuity of the game, Sharkey et al (1993) and Spulber (1993) indicate that the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not possible. In my paper, I show that when
firms are allowed to monitor each others entry decision in the market, pure strategy
equilibrium exists. The paper investigates the equilibrium in a dynamic Bertrand duopoly
where firms do not know the cost of other firms and firms face an avoidable sunk cost when
they decide to enter the market. In this model, firms are allowed to monitor rival’s entry
decision before making their pricing decision. Firms are also allowed to communicate
with each other via announcements before they make the entry decision. I show that
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1. Introduction
there exists two classes of Pure-Strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in this game. In one
class of equilibrium (symmetric) only the low cost firms enter, and in the other class of
equilibrium (asymmetric) only one firm enters while the other (inefficient firms) stay out
irrespective of their cost types. This is a new existence result and the paper provides full
characterization of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. The paper also explores the effect
of pre-play communication in the game to see whether this brings cooperation among
firms, however, the results indicate that such communication is cheap talk and has no
effect on the set of equilibria. In the second paper, I research the possibility of collusion
among price competing firms that try to obtain private information about each other by
observing a third party public information (such as media publication, accounting report
or the like). Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008) have shown that collusion among infinitely
Bertrand competing firms with asymmetric and unknown marginal costs is possible under
proper inter-temporal market sharing agreements between firms. They suggest schemes
to implement the first-best outcome that supports a Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE).
In my paper, I assume a similar set-up, but also assume that firms pay an avoidable fixed
cost of entry in the period they decide to participate in the market. This set-up is widely
present across industries such as the airlines industry where firms have to renew their
terminal lease agreements every period before competing on price. In line with Athey and
Bagwell (2001, 2008), I maintain that in each period firms receive an iid cost shock and
are allowed to communicate before making their entry decisions, but to be more consistent
with the wider reality present in todays economy, I do not allow for explicit market sharing
agreements. As a result, and unlike Athey and Bagwell (2008), the stage game in this set-
up has permanent inefficiencies (Patra, 2015) where either the market is not served with
positive probability or the entering firm earns a negative profit with positive probability.
But with infinite interaction, the collusive equilibrium (a PPE ) presented in my paper
develops a strategy to restore market efficiency where the market is always served and
the entering firms receives its share of the monopoly profit. Allowing for communication
among firms facilitates a self-enforcing collusive agreement among competing firms and I
15
1. Introduction
study the value of this communication both from collusion and efficiency perspective. I
provide a characterization of the PPE and show that there exists a discount factor strictly
less than one for which this equilibrium exists. The conclusion that emerges then is that
the presence of the avoidable fixed cost makes it easier for the firms to collude, and market
efficiency is achieved in this PPE in the sense that, among the firms who enter, only lowest
cost firms produce.
In my third paper, I observe that the classical outcome of competitive profit when firms
with symmetric constant marginal costs compete one-shot a la Bertrand while having per-
fect information about each other has been difficult to replicate in different informational
and asymmetric cost conditions. Spulber (1995) shows that, in a standard Bertrand game
with parameterized asymmetric costs, all but the highest cost firm expect positive profit
when costs are drawn from a continuous distribution. In a recent paper, Routledge (2010)
shows that in a classical model of Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods and
constant marginal costs, only a mixed strategy Nash-equilibrium exists when there is dis-
crete cost uncertainty. In my paper, I show that, under equal market sharing rule (which
is the assumption maintained in the previous two cases and several others), there exists a
set of Pure Strategy Bayesian-Nash Equilibria (PSBNE) in a Bertrand duopoly where one
firm’s cost is known and the other firm’s cost is a draw from a commonly known probabil-
ity distribution on a support of two discrete costs. I provide a full characterization of the
equilibrium and point out that one-sided cost uncertainty and bounded known cost types
are sufficient to guarantee the existence of PSBNE.
Finally, in my fourth paper in the second part of the thesis we study statistical fluc-
tuations and correlations between thermodynamic properties along the fluid side of the
melting line of the Lennard-Jones (LJ). Using the physical properties of Molecular Dy-
namics (MD) computer simulation we generate data between the configurational part of
the pressure and potential energy, and the repulsive and attractive parts of the potential
energy. We compute the coefficients of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and the
Pearson coefficient and other statistical measures. The cross correlation between Scatter
16
1. Introduction
plots show that at constant temperature the Weeks-Chandler-Andersen (WCA) decom-
position of the Lennard-Jones repulsive and attractive potential energy components show
a qualitative change along the melting line. At low temperature the two components
are correlated, while they are anticorrelated in the high temperature limit. There is an
intermediate temperature range in which the two potential energy components are effec-
tively decorrelated. The various trends along the melting line were found to be weakly
dependent on the force field used to generate the distribution of states, namely, the LJ
potential, inverse power potential with exponent 12, and the repulsive term in the WCA
decomposition of the LJ potential.
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Part I
Bertrand Competition with
Unknown Costs
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Chapter 2
Introduction
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to fill a gap in the literature on equilibrium characterization in
Bertrand games where firms do not know each other’s marginal cost and firms face an
avoidable fixed cost[24] of entry. Fixed costs are important considerations in economics
in general and strategic games in particular, due largely to the technical fact that such a
cost renders a firm’s decision to participate in the market an endogenous choice. Market
examples of avoidable fixed cost would include periodic renewal of license, participation
fee in auctions, expenses conducting a market survey before assuming business etc.. Firms
incur these expenses before they compete with each other with respect to any strategic
variable. As such, firms make their choice to enter the market by comparing the entry fee
with their expected profit based on the nature of competition that is going to ensue once
they enter the market. What is interesting here is that we allow firms to observe rival’s
entry decision before they make a decision on their price. Observation of such decision
by firms is more close to reality as compared to the prior literature where much focus has
been on firms making both entry and pricing decisions simultaneously1. The avoidable
1See Binmore[3]
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2.2. Literature Review 2. Introduction
fixed cost considered here is an exogenous sunk cost2 which has no effect on the marginal
cost of the firms. We show the existence of classes of Pure Strategy Perfect Bayesian-Nash
Equilibrium (PSBNE) in this game. In one class of equilibrium only the lowest cost firms
decide to enter the market and supply. In the other class of equilibrium, one firm enters
the market and and the other firm stays out irrespective of their types. We provide a full
characterization of this equilibrium along with a numerical illustration of the game.
2.2 Literature Review
Francois Bertrand (1822-1900) [2], as a review response to the quantity competing oligopoly
model proposed by Cournot in 1883, modeled competition among firms using price as their
strategic variable. Bertrand’s observation that such a competition might lead to indefi-
nite undercutting of prices among oligopolists was falsified later with the advent of game
theoretic tools in economics. It was shown that with a small number of identical firms pro-
ducing homogeneous goods and having perfect information about the market and rivals,
Bertrand competition would yield competitive outcome in equilibrium, leaving ‘zero’ profit
for the oligopolists. However, due to the existence of the fundamental discontinuity in the
profit functions of Bertrand competing firms with homogeneous product, many existence
results involve tedious characterization of the equilibrium. As such, existence results in
Bertrand games are still an active area of research. Fixed cost, on the other hand, is an
important economic variable for firms. A firm may not want to undertake production if
its expected returns, given the strategic situation of the firm, are not high enough to cover
the fixed costs. Thus, given the nature of the fixed cost3 and timing of the game, the
structure of equilibrium in the pricing game changes. For example Baye and Kovenock
(2008) [1] showed that with a fully avoidable fixed cost and constant marginal cost of firms
there does not exist any pure or mixed strategy Nash-equilibrium in the full information
Bertrand game. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)[5] (KS hereafter), showed that in a two
2see Sutton[24]
3endogenous or exogenous
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stage game where firms decide on capacities (a fixed cost) in the first stage and compete
in price in the second stage, the unique Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the Cournot
outcome. However, in the KS game the capacity level decided at the first stage has a cost
reducing effect in the second stage. Spulber (1995)[5] looked into a basic one-shot game
of price competition with unknown costs. He has shown that, with asymmetric costs and
other regularity assumptions, all but the highest cost firm expect positive profit when
costs are unknown. He has also shown that when firms are operating in a contestable
market and when there are unknown fixed cost of entry, the resulting equilibrium is that
all firms except the highest cost firm enters, since all but the firm with the highest fixed
cost would have positive expected profit of entry.
Saporiti and Coloma (2010) [10] work out equilibrium situations where price competing
firms face, among others, avoidable fixed costs in a perfect information game. Under equal
market sharing rule 4, they show that, with an avoidable fixed cost and the variable cost
function of firms not being sub-additive when they produce market supply at the lowest
price, there always exists a Bertrand equilibrium in pure strategies5.
This paper is organized in the following order. First, we present the basic set-up of the
model. Next, we present the equilibrium analysis of the stage game. Finally, in the last
section, we present a numerical example to illustrate the model.
2.3 Basic Set-Up
In this game G, two ex ante identical firms, 1 and 2, compete one-shot in a standard
Bertrand model with homogeneous goods. The inverse demand function D(p) satisfies
regularity conditions D′(p) < 0 < D(p). Let pi ∈ R+ be the price chosen by firm i ∈ {1, 2}.
Firms in this game face an exogenous fixed cost 6, F , when they decide to participate in
4firms agree to split market shares equally when they charge the same price in the market
5need not be symmetric
6See Sutton (Chapter 1) for a detailed discussion [24]
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the market. Such fixed costs may be viewed as renewal of licenses, leases etc. that
businesses normally incur every year before they make production and pricing decisions
for the subsequent year. Thus, effectively, firms make a decision to ‘enter’ the market
or ‘not enter’ based on their comparison between the expected pay-off from the ensuing
competition after they decide to enter and the fixed cost they will need to pay when they
enter.
Accordingly, we assume that every firm has a total cost function represented by
Ci(q) =

ciq + F, if enter
0, otherwise
where ci is the realized marginal cost of firm i. ci is an IID random variable that is
equal to cL with probability ηL and cH with probability 1 − ηL. We assume ηL < 12 .
This assumption ensures that there is a higher probability that a firm will realize high
cost and thus represents a more interesting scenario, since this is a situation firms would
have a stronger motivation to cooperate than the reverse situation7. We call a firm to
be of type L (or H) if it faces a marginal cost cL (or cH). For convenience we will use
cL(or cH) and L(or H) interchangeably. The state space of types is represented here by
Ω = {L,H}×{L,H} where Ωi = (L,H) and the types are realized from a common prior
which is common knowledge to all.
The timing of the game is as follows: (1) firms observe their type, L or H (2) firm i
makes a decision to enter the market or not based on the realization of its own type,
7In fact, we only need an asymmetric probability weight for the types in order to characterize our
PSBNE. So, WLOG, we have assumed ηL <
1
2
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ci ∈ {cL, cH}, (3) Firms monitor each other’s entry decision and subsequently compete in
price. We denote the space of entry decision for firm i as Υi where Υi = {E,N} ≡ {E =
enter, N = not enter} and Υ to be the state space of entry decisions pertaining to the
available types defined by Υ = Υi×Υ−i = (E,N)× (E,N). The entry decision function
is ei(ci) : Ω
i → Υi and we denote the realized entry decision of firm i by υi ∈ Υi where
υi = ei(ci). Denote υ = (υ
i, υ−i) where υ ∈ Υ. For future notational use we define
Υ = (Υi,Υ−i). As is evident, in this set up, if a firm enters it incurs a fixed cost of F . If
a firm doesn’t enter, its profit is identically equal to ‘0’.
This game can be represented in the following diagram.
Figure 2.1: Game G
(x): no pay-off for any firm; (pi
j
i ): monopoly pay-off for firm i ∈ {1, 2} when its type j ∈ {H,L} ; Nature : ‘nature’ is choosing type
of firm i ∈ {1, 2}; (Dst): profit from duopoly price competition where firm 1 is type type s ∈ {L,H} and firm 2 is type t ∈ {L,H};
byx: belief of player x that the rival is of type y
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We now state our assumptions of the model.
Assumption 1. There exists a pˆ < ∞ such that D(pˆ) = 0.
Assumption 2. There exists a price, p such that Di(p)p− cHDi(p)− F ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let’s denote the optimal monopoly price, quantity and profit depending upon its cost
type by pj , qj ,Πj for types j ∈ {L,H}. We also define the operating profit of each firm
by Πj− = Πj + F, j ∈ {L,H}.
Assumption 3. (1−ηL)ΠH− < F < (1−ηL)ΠL−, ΠH− > (1−ηL)(cH−cL)q(cH) > F .
Assumption 2 guarantees that there is sufficient demand in the market for a firm to operate
at profit even if all the firms find that they have the highest possible marginal cost. The
first part of Assumption 3 ensures that the fixed entry cost is below the expected operating
monopoly profit of a low cost firm and above the expected operating monopoly profit of a
high cost firm. The second part of Assumption 3 implies that the expected profit of a low
cost firm when it undercuts a type H rival’s marginal cost still earns a high enough profit
to enter the market without incurring losses. To make economic sense I have assumed
that this profit is lower than the operating monopoly profit of the high cost firm.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis of the Game
We solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this game where we will consider both
symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. We define the strategy structure of this game
as follows. We retain the entry strategy of firm i to be ei(ci) : Ω
i → Υi since entry is
dependent on type of the firm only which is the respective firm’s private information. Then
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the subsequent pricing strategy for firm i can be defined as ρi(ci,υ) = Ω
i × Υ−i → R+
since a firm observes rival’s entry decision before making its pricing decision. We define
an entry policy vector in this game by e(c) ≡ (e1(c1), e2(c2)) where c ≡ (c1, c2) is the
vector of realized cost types of the duopolists. Finally, the pricing strategy profile can be
represented by a vector ρ(c,υ) = (ρ1(c1, υ
2), ρ2(c2, υ
1)).
We denote an equilibrium pricing strategy profile by %∗ = (p1∗, p2∗) ∈ p∗ where both
p1∗, p2∗ are a six-tuple consisting of the entry strategy of the form ej∗ = (νjL, ν
j
H) ≡
(firm j’s entry decision when it realizes type L, firm j’s entry decision when it realizes
type H) when (νjL, ν
j
H) ∈ Υ, j ∈ {1, 2}, and pricing strategy of the form pj∗θ,γ where
(θ, γ) ∈ {L,H}×{E,N} ∈ Ωj ×Υ−j and pi∗θ,γ ≡ (price when type L and the other enters,
price when type L and the other does not enter, price when type H and the other enters,
price when type H and the other does not enter). Therefore, we denote an entry strategy
profile in this game by (ν1L, ν
1
H), (ν
2
L, ν
2
H) and the resulting full pricing strategy profile by
((ν1L, ν
1
H), (ν
2
L, ν
2
H), (p
1
LE , p
1
LN , p
1
HE , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
LN , p
2
HE , p
2
HN ))
where p∗ ∈ R2+|Ωi×Υ−i|+|Ω−i×Υi|. Note that a firm does not make any pricing decision
when it does not enter in this game. Now, let’s assume pL, pH to be optimal monopoly
prices for type L and type H respectively when they face demand D(p). From the condi-
tions above we can deduce that when a rival, say firm 2, does not enter then, observing
this, firm 1 sets its price at the monopoly price with respect to its realized cost. As such
we can fix the prices in such cases at their respective monopoly price. So, the updated
entry and pricing strategy profile will be
25
2.4. Equilibrium Analysis of the Game 2. Introduction
((ν1L, ν
1
H), (ν
2
L, ν
2
H), (p
1
LE , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HE , p
1
HN = p
H), (p2LE , p
2
LN = p
L, p2HE , p
2
HN = p
H))
Now we define the beliefs in this game at different nodes. Observe that the beliefs of
players after ‘Nature’ has drawn the types (call it first-stage beliefs) are trivially defined,
because all of the corresponding informations sets are reached with positive probability.
For example, after the nature has selected that firm 1 is of type L, the belief of firm 1 that
firm 2 is type L with probability ηL i, which is derived from the given prior. Other such
beliefs are analogously defined with consistency since they are trivial as discussed in the
above example. We will not be using additional notation to explicitly define those beliefs
into the model. We will, however, introduce notations to define beliefs during the price
competition stage of the game. Let biJyz , i ∈ {1, 2},J ∈ {L,H} be the belief of type J
(already assigned by nature) player i that player ¬i ≡ −i ∈ {1, 2} is of type y ∈ {L,H}
when player −i has taken action z ∈ {E,N}. Thus, the system of beliefs are given by
a sixteen-tuple µ ≡ {biJyz | i,−i ∈ {1, 2}; y,J ∈ Ω; z ∈ {E,N}}. However, notice that
the complexity of representation can be drastically reduced since (1) belief of any firm i’s
about the rival −i’s type is not dependent on the realization of firm i’s own type, since the
cost draws are IID; (2) if firm i believes that rival is of type L with probability u ∈ [0, 1]
then he also believes that the rivals of type H with probability 1 − u; and (3) the belief
that firm i forms about firm −i when firm −i has not entered does not play an active part
in the description of the PBE. Thus we denote that firm i believes that the probability
that firm −i is of type L when firm −i has entered is bi, i ∈ {1, 2} which are the only
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beliefs we will describe in the strategy profiles.
Proposition 2.4.1. This game G possesses two classes of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE) corresponding to the entry and pricing strategy profiles as follows:
1. Symmetric Equilibrium: In this equilibrium a type L firm always enters and a type H
firm stays out of the market. Notationally, ((E,N), (E,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN =
pH), (p2LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN = p
L, p2HN = p
H))
2. Asymmetric Equilibrium: In this equilibrium, only one firm enters irrespective of its type. Nota-
tionally, ((E,E), (N,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN = p
H)), (p2LE , p
2
HE ,
p2LN = p
L, p2HN = p
H))8
3. No other entry strategy profile in this game forms a part of any pure strategy equilibrium in this
game, G.
We proceed with the proof of this theorem in a case-by-case basis and we define the
beliefs as a part of the proof.
2.4.0.1 Symmetric Equilibrium: Entry Strategy (EN,EN)
The strategy profile ((E,N), (E,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN = p
H), (p2LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN =
pL, p2HN = p
H)) forms a part of a PBE of the game, G.
Proof: First, by consistency, the beliefs of players in any PBE with this strategy profile
are given by (b1 = 1, b2 = 1). Given these beliefs, the best response function of firm 2,
8Of course as a corollary, an equilibrium strategy profile can be analogously defined
as ((N,N), (E,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN = p
H), (p2LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN = p
L, p2HN =
pH))).See case2.4.0.11.
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from the optimality of p2LE :
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − , if p1LE > cL
p2LE ≥ p1LE , if p1LE = cL
p2LE > p
1
LE , if p
1
LE < cL
The best response function of firm 1, from the optimality of p1LE :
BR1(p
2
LE) =

p1LE = p
2
LE −  > cL, if p2LE > cL
p1LE ≥ p2LE if p2LE = cL
p1LE > p
2
LE , if p
2
LE < cL
As we can observe, for all price levels in the set [0, cL), type L firms’ best responses are
to set price above each other. But @ a maximum in the set [0, cL) implying @ a fixed point
in the best response correspondences of both firms when they are type L and the assumed
entry strategy profile is ((E,N), (E,N)) . In the similar setting, for prices in the set
(cL,∞), the best responses are firms undercutting each other. Since @ a minimum in this
set of prices there is no fixed point correspondence of undercutting best responses. Finally,
we verify that the best response correspondences are satisfied at the pricing strategy profile
{p1LE = p2LE = cL, p1HE = p2HE = cH , p1LN = p2LN = pL, p1HN = p2HN = pH} 9. Given
this equilibrium pricing profile, the associated expected profit of a type H firm, say firm
9Note that if firm i ∈ {1, 2} enters, any price set by the firm i above cH will be undercut by rival j 6= i
irrespective of j′s type. Additionally, any price lower than cH for a type H firm is dominated by cH , since
the firm runs the risk of being over bid by its rival when the rival is of type H and is forced to supply the
whole market. So a type H firm in this case never gets any more than ‘0’ expected operating profit when
the rival enters.
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1, is ‘0’ when it stays out, and (1− ηL)ΠH− −F when it enters. This is because, if firm 1,
being type H, observes that firm 2 has not entered, makes monopoly profit ΠH
− −F and
makes a profit of ‘0-F’ if it observes firm 2 enter . Since every firm’s belief is (EN,EN) and
since prob(cH) = 1− ηL, firm 1 believes that the firm 2 would not enter with probability
1− ηL, in which case firm 1 would expect to make type H monopoly profit. Similarly, for
type L firm, when the firm enters the game, it earns an expected profit of (1−ηL)ΠL−−F
and ‘0’ if it stays out. Since (1− ηL)ΠH− < F < (1− ηL)ΠL− , its obviuos that a type H
firm would not expect to make any positive return when it enters where as a type L firm
would always expect to make a positive profit when it enters, enforcing the belief of each
other. 
2.4.0.2 Asymmetric Equilibrium: Entry Strategy ((E,E),(N,N))
The strategy profile ((E,E), (N,N), (p1LE = cL, p
1
HE < cH , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN = p
H)),
(p2LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN = p
L, p2HN = p
H)) forms a part of a PSBNE of the game, G.
Proof: In order to analyze if this strategy profile is an equilibrium, first we consider the
pricing strategy10 of firm 2 given the prices that firm 1 sets. We then assume that the
entry strategy ((E,E), (N,N)) forms a part of the equilibrium of the game. Then we
analyze the game to see if firm 2 could profitably deviate given the strategy of firm 1 in
order to disprove our assumption. Note here that since firm 1 believes that firm 2 is not
going to enter irrespective of its type, if firm 2 actually enters, any belief that firm 1 forms
about the type of firm 2 is going to be Bayes-consistent. Thus, the belief of players in this
section is given by (b1 = P, b2 = ηL) for any P ∈ [0, 1] .
10See appendix for the pricing strategy of firm 2
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Observe that if a type L firm 2 does not find it profitable to enter then the equilibrium
in the pricing game must be such that firm 2, irrespective of its type, does not get an
expected profit above F . We will now show by contradiction that this implies that type
H firm 1 must be pricing below cH when both firms enter. Assume that a type H firm 1
sets p1HE ≥ cH . But then, a type L firm 2 can set P 2LE = cH −  which would guarantee
an expected profit of at least (1 − ηL)(cH − cL)D(cH) and this will be enough to cover
the cost of entry F for firm 2 (by assumption 3). This means that a type L firm 2 will
find it profitable to enter which is a contradiction that firm 2 will always choose to stay
out as a part of its entry strategy. Now we have established that for entry strategy profile
((E,E), (N,N)) to be in equilibrium it must be true that a type H firm 1 is pricing strictly
below cH . If a type H firm 2 prices strictly above p
1
HE it will lose the market to firm 1
and make ‘0’ profit if firm 1 is type H. On the other hand, if firm 2 prices weakly below
p1HE(< cH) then firm 2 will gain market, but it will make negative profit in expectation,
since, by assumption, firm 2 knows that firm 1 is type H with probability 1 − ηL > 0.
Thus, firm 2 will find it more profitable to price strictly above p1HE . Given this, suppose
that when firm 2 enters, firm 1 assigns a positive probability weight to firm 2 being type
H. Since we have shown that p1HE is strictly below cH in equilibrium, and since a type H
firm 2 is going to price above p1HE , a type H firm 1 will receive negative expected pay-off
in this case. In such a case, a type H firm 1 will find it more profitable to price strictly
above p2HE , which contradicts our assumption that firms are in equilibrium. So in the
equilibrium with entry strategy profile ((E,E), (N,N)), firm 1 must have no probability
weight on firm 2 being type H. So now we fix that it is a consistent belief of firm 1 that if
firm 2 has entered then firm 2 is type L. Now, we inspect the pricing strategy of a type L
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firm 1. Given that firm 1 believes that an entering firm 2 is type L, a type L firm 1 would
price at p1LE = p
2
LE −  if p2LE is above cL and p1LE > p2LE if p2LE is below cL. Now lets
fix that both p1LE and p
1
HE are above cL. Now, given that firm 2 knows the probability
distribution of types of firm 1 whose strategy is to enter the market irrespective of its
realized type and given that firm 2 knows that a type H firm would price strictly below
cH , a type L firm 2 will set price p
2
LE = p
1
HE −  > cL if p1HE ≥ cL + q(p
1
LE)(p
1
LE−cL)
(1−ηL)q(p1HE)
= K,
otherwise firm 2 will set a price equal to p1LE −  > cL. Then a type L firm 1 knows
that the entering firm 2 (which firm 1 believes to be type L only) would set the price at
p2LE = p
1
HE − . As such, a type L firm 1 would set a price below p2LE since by doing
such firm 1 will gain the market and make a profit greater than ‘zero’, which is aprofitable
deviation. Arguing similarly, if p1HE < K < cH a type L firm 2 will set its price at p1LE−.
In such a case, a type L firm 1 would undercut firm 2’s price, which is, again, a deviation
from the equilibrium. Now, suppose that a type L firm 1 sets a price above p1HE . Then a
type L entering firm 2 would undercut p1LE by  in this case. Given this, a type L firm 1
will undercut the price set by firm 2 in this case, which is a profitable deviation. Finally,
for any price that a type L firm 1 sets strictly below cL, a type L frim 2 will best respond
with setting a price above it. In such a case the type L firm 1 can profitably deviate by
setting a price above firm 2’s price and strictly below cL. So far, we have exhausted all
candidates for equilibrium in the support of prices. The only surviving candidate is a type
L firm 1 pricing at cL. If a type L firm 1 prices at cL then an entering type L firm 2 would
set a price at cL . In such a case a type L firm 1 does not have any profitable deviation.
Thus p1LE = cL is an equilibrium condition. Finally, we inspect the equilibrium pricing
strategy of a type H firm 2. At this point, firm 2 knows the probability distribution of
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types of firm 1, belief of firm 1 (entering firm 2 is type L), a type H firm 1 would price
strictly below cH and a type L firm 1 would price at cL. Given this information, a type H
firm 2 would have to price below p1HE < cH to gain positive market share in expectation.
But in such a case p2HE < p
1
HE < cH and thus firm 2 will earn a negative profit. So a
profitable deviation for type H firm 2 will be to charge a price strictly above p1HE , which
is also the equilibrium pricing strategy for a type H firm 2. The deductions above define
the complete set of conditions for an equilibrium to hold where ((E,E), (N,N)) forms a
part of the equilibrium strategy profile.
Note that in theasymmetric equilibrium involving the entry strategy profile ((E,E),(N,N))
(or ((N,N),(E,E))) a type H entering firm prices below its marginal cost, cH , which is a
weakly dominated strategy. This is an unattractive feature of this equilibrium as compared
to the the symmetric equilibrium.
2.4.0.3 No other entry strategy profile in this game forms a part of any
equilibrium in this game, G.
We present the proof of this section in a case-by-case basis in the appendix 3.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that when firms make an endogenous entry in a standard
Bertrand duopoly with discrete cost uncertainty, there exists two classes of PSBNE, one
with the entry strategy profile ((E,N), (E,N)) and the other with the entry strategy
profile ((E,E), (N,N)). Baye and Kovenock [1] and Spulber[5] have shown previously,
under symmetric market sharing and full information, there is no-equilibrium existence in
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games with price competition and entry, either in pure or in mixed strategy. In a related
work Routledge (2010)[4] has shown that in a classical Bertrand model with two-sided
symmetric uncertainty and discrete costs, there does exist only mixed strategy Bayesian-
Nash equilibria of the game. Thus our result adds an existence of PSBNE result in a
price competition game with cost uncertainty and entry. Our existence result depends
largely on the fact that firms can observe each other’s entry decision before they compete
in price. However, there are some bleak features of the classes of equilibria we find in
this game. With the equilibrium following from the entry strategy profile (EN,EN),
the market will not be served with positive probability, i.e., when both firms draw high
cost simultaneously. In the second equilibrium following from the entry strategy profile
((E,E), (N,N)) (or ((N,N), (E,E))) a type H entering firm will be charging a price below
its marginal cost, cH , in equilibrium. Therefore, one of the future research directions would
be to consider possibilities that would help improve equilibrium outcome of this price game
in different settings. In particular, it will be interesting to consider extending this model
to a repeated play of this game and explore the equilibrium, since such consideration is
close to real market situations.
2.6 Appendix 1
The pricing strategy of firm 2,the not entering firm, when the entry strategy is ((E,E), (N,N)),
is as follows:
1. Case 1 : p1LE ≤ p1HE < cL
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BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE > p
1
HE
p2HE > p
1
HE
2. Case 2 : p1LE ≤ p1HE = cL
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE ≥ p1HE
p2HE > p
1
HE
3. Case 3 : p1LE < cL < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − ,
p2HE > p
1
HE
4. Case 4 : cL = p
1
LE < p
1
HE < cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE ≥ p1HE ,
5. Case 5 : cL < p
1
LE = p
1
HE < cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − 
p2HE > p
1
HE
6. Case 6 : cL < p
1
LE = p
1
HE < cH
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BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if p1HE ≥ cL + q(p
1
LE)(p
1
LE−cL)
(1−ηL)q(p1HE)
B : p2LE > p
1
HE if otherwise
p2HE ≥ cH
7. Case 7 : cL < p
1
LE < p
1
HE = cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1LE ≥ cL + (1− ηL) q(cH)(cH−cL)q(p1LE)
B : p2LE > p
1
HE if otherwise
p2HE ≥ cH
8. Case 8 : cL < p
1
LE = p
1
HE = cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − 
p2HE ≥ p1HE
9. Case 9 : cL < p
1
LE < cH < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1LE ≥ cL + (1− ηL) q(p
1
HE)(p
1
HE−cL)
q(p1LE)
B : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
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10. Case 10 : cH = p
1
LE < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1HE ≥ cL + 1(1−ηL)
q(cH)(cH−cL)
q(p1HE)
B : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
11. Case 11 : cL = p
1
LE < p
1
HE = cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE ≥ p1HE
12. Case 12 : cL = p
1
LE < cH < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
13. Case 13 : p1LE < cL < cH < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
14. Case 14 : cL < cH < p
1
LE < p
1
HE
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BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1LE ≥ cL + (1− ηL) q(p
1
HE)(p
1
HE−cL)
q(p1LE)
B : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
C : p2HE = p
1
LE −  if p1HE ≤ cH + 1(1−ηL)
q(p1LE)(p
1
LE−cH)
q(p1HE)
D : p2HE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
15. Case 15 : cL < cH < p
1
LE = p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − 
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
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x: not a compatible best response correspondence. 
y: a compatible best response correspondence 
For the indicated conditions like A, B  etc., please refer to the paper. 
As is established here there does not exist any equilibrium pricing strategy for the entry strategy profile (EE, EE).  
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2.8.0.4 Entry Strategy ((E,N),(E,E))
The strategy profile ((E,N), (E,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN )), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does
not form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G.
Proof: First, by consistency, the belief of players in this section is given by (b1 =
ηL, b
2 = 1). The best response function of firm 2 from the optimality of p2LE can be
deduced as follows: ;
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − , if p1LE > cL
p2LE ≥ p1LE , if p1LE = cL
p2LE > p
1
LE , if p
1
LE < cL
and from the optimality of p2HE ;
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2HE = p
1
L − , if p1LE > cH
p2HE ≥ p1LE , if p1LE = cH
p2HE > p
1
LE , if p
1
LE < cH
Now we discuss the best responses of firm 1 from the optimality of p1L in a case-by-case
basis. We will inspect firm 1 trying to set prices in the following intervals, which will
exhaust cases of all possible prices:
1. Case 1 : p1LE < cL
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In this case, firm 2 would best respond with
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2LE > p
1
LE , if p
1
LE < cL
p2HE > p
1
LE , if p
1
LE < cL
Given this best response and since the interval [0, cL) is open upwards, there does
not exist an optimal strategy for firm 1. So @ an equilibrium pricing strategy in this
interval.
2. Case 2 : p1LE = cL
In this case, firm 2 would best respond with
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2LE ≥ cL, if p1LE = cL
p2HE > cL, if p
1
LE = cL
But then, immediately, firm 1’s best response would be to charge p2HE −  > cL. So
@ an equilibrium pricing strategy in at cL.
3. Case 3 : cL < p
1
LE < cH
In this case, firm 2 would best respond with
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2LE ≥ p1LE −  > cL, if cL < p1LE < cH
p2HE > p
1
LE > cL, if cL < p
1
LE < cH
But then, immediately, firm 1’s best response would be to charge p2LE −  > cL. So
@ an equilibrium pricing strategy in the interval cL < p1LE < cH .
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4. Case 4 : p1LE = cH
In this case, firm 2 would best respond with
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE −  > cL, if p1LE = cH
p2HE ≥ cH , if p1LE = cH
But then, immediately, firm 1’s best response would be to charge p2LE −  > cL. So
@ an equilibrium pricing strategy when p1LE = cH .
5. Case 5 : p1LE > cH
In this case, firm 2 would best respond with
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE −  > cL, if p1LE > cH
p2HE = p
1
LE − , if p1LE > cH
But then, immediately, firm 1’s best response would be to charge p2LE −  > cL.
This is periodic. So @ an equilibrium pricing strategy when p1LE > cH .
This completes the proof that there does not exists an optimal pricing strategy in the
strategy profile outlined in this case. Consequently, there does not exist and equilibrium
strategy profile in this case. 
2.8.0.5 Entry Strategy ((E,N),(N,E))
The strategy profile, ((E,N), (N,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN )), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does
not form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G. Proof: First, the belief of players in this
section is given by (b1 = 0, b2 = 1). From the optimality of p2HE we get the best response
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correspondence as follows:
BR2(p
1
LE) =

p2HE = p
1
LE − , if p1LE > cH
p2HE ≥ p1LE , if p1LE = cH
p2HE > p
1
LE , if p
1
LE < cH
From the optimality of p1LE
BR1(p
2
HE) =

p1LE = p
2
HE − , if p2HE > cL
p1LE ≥ p2HE , if p2HE = cL
p1LE > p
2
HE , if p
2
HE < cL
With the best responses defined, we now inspect for Nash Equilibrium in different
intervals of the price space, [0,∞).
1. Case 1 ( < cL): The best responses for firms 1 and 2 in this region respectively are
p1LE > p
2
HE and p
2
HE > p
1
LE , which is cyclic. So we do not have a NE in this region.
2. Case 2 ( = cL): The best responses for firms 1 and 2 in this region respectively are
p1LE ≥ p2HE and p2HE > p1LE , which is cyclic. So we do not have a NE in this region.
3. Case 3 (cL, cH): The best responses for firms 1 and 2 in this region respectively are
p1LE = p
2
HE −  and p2HE > p1LE , which is cyclic. So we do not have a NE in this
region.
4. Case 4 (= cH): The best responses for firms 1 and 2 in this region respectively are
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p1LE = p
2
HE −  and p2HE ≥ p1LE , which is cyclic. So we do not have a NE in this
region.
5. Case 5 (> cH): The best responses for firms 1 and 2 in this region respectively are
p1LE = p
2
HE −  and p2HE = p1LE −  , which is cyclic. So we do not have a NE in
this region.
Now we have exhausted all cases and we establish that we do not have an equilibrium
pricing strategy in the case of the entry strategy profile ((E,N), (N,E)). Thus the entry
strategy profile ((E,N), (N,E)) cannot form a part of a Nash Equilibrium strategy profile.
2.8.0.6 Entry Strategy ((E,N),(N,N))
The strategy profile ((E,N), (N,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not
form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G. Proof: First, the belief of players in this section
is given by (b1 = P, b2 = 1) for any P ∈ [0, 1]. Now, suppose the above strategy profile
forms an equilibrium of the game. Now consider the following deviation. Firm 2 plays
‘enter’ and charges p1LE = cL and p
1
LN = p
L. Apparently the expected profit from such
deviation is (1− ηL)ΠL− − F which is positive. So such a deviation is credible. Q.E.D.
2.8.0.7 Entry Strategy ((E,E),(E,E))
The strategy profile ((E,E), (E,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not
form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G. Proof: First, the belief of players in this section
is given by (b1 = ηL, b
2 = ηL). WLOG, we first describe the best responses for firm 2
from the optimality of its type dependent pricing strategy.
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1. Case 1 : p1LE ≤ p1HE < cL
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE > p
1
HE
p2HE > p
1
HE
2. Case 2 : p1LE ≤ p1HE = cL
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE ≥ p1HE
p2HE > p
1
HE
3. Case 3 : p1LE < cL < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − ,
p2HE > p
1
HE
4. Case 4 : cL = p
1
LE < p
1
HE < cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE ≥ p1HE ,
5. Case 5 : cL < p
1
LE = p
1
HE < cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − 
p2HE > p
1
HE
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6. Case 6 : cL < p
1
LE = p
1
HE < cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if p1HE ≥ cL + q(p
1
LE)(p
1
LE−cL)
(1−ηL)q(p1HE)
B : p2LE > p
1
HE if otherwise
p2HE ≥ cH
7. Case 7 : cL < p
1
LE < p
1
HE = cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1LE ≥ cL + (1− ηL) q(cH)(cH−cL)q(p1LE)
B : p2LE > p
1
HE if otherwise
p2HE ≥ cH
8. Case 8 : cL < p
1
LE = p
1
HE = cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − 
p2HE ≥ p1HE
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9. Case 9 : cL < p
1
LE < cH < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1LE ≥ cL + (1− ηL) q(p
1
HE)(p
1
HE−cL)
q(p1LE)
B : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
10. Case 10 : cH = p
1
LE < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1HE ≥ cL + 1(1−ηL)
q(cH)(cH−cL)
q(p1HE)
B : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
11. Case 11 : cL = p
1
LE < p
1
HE = cH
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE ≥ p1HE
12. Case 12 : cL = p
1
LE < cH < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
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13. Case 13 : p1LE < cL < cH < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
HE − 
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
14. Case 14 : cL < cH < p
1
LE < p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

A : p2LE = p
1
LE −  if p1LE ≥ cL + (1− ηL) q(p
1
HE)(p
1
HE−cL)
q(p1LE)
B : p2LE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
C : p2HE = p
1
LE −  if p1HE ≤ cH + 1(1−ηL)
q(p1LE)(p
1
LE−cH)
q(p1HE)
D : p2HE = p
1
HE −  if otherwise
15. Case 15 : cL < cH < p
1
LE = p
1
HE
BR2(p
1
LE , p
1
HE) =

p2LE = p
1
LE − 
p2HE = p
1
HE − 
Since the strategy profile is symmetric, the best responses of player 1 will also be
symmetric to that of player 2. We then inspect for a NE of pricing strategy using the
table provided. We conclude from the table that there does not exist an equilibrium
pricing strategy for the subgame with entry strategy profile ((E,E), (E,E)). Therefore,
we can also conclude that the strategy profile ((E,E), (E,E)) cannot form part of a NE
strategy profile for the game we are analyzing. Hence, we do not have any equilibrium
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pay-off for players in this game.
2.8.0.8 Entry Strategy ((E,E),(N,E))
The strategy profile ((E,E), (N,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not
form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G. Proof: First, the belief of players in this section
is given by (b1 = 0, b2 = ηL). Now, lets consider this equilibrium profile. Then ∃ a price
p2HE for which the profit of firm 2 is greater than ‘0’. Now consider the following deviation
by firm 2. Play ‘E’ when type L and set p2LE = p
2
HE . Its obvious that this is a profitable
deviation for firm 2. Q.E.D.
2.8.0.9 Entry Strategy ((N,E),(N,E))
The strategy profile ((N,E), (N,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not
form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G. Proof: First, the belief of players in this section
is given by(b1 = 0, b2 = 0). Assume the above strategy profile is an equilibrium of this
game. Now consider the following deviation by player 1. Play ‘Enter’ when type L and
charge p1LE = p
1
HE . It is apparent that this is a profitable deviation for firm 1. Q.E.D.
2.8.0.10 Entry Strategy ((N,E),(N,N))
The strategy profile ((N,E), (N,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not
form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G.
Proof: First, the belief of players in this section is given by (b1 = P, b2 = 0) for
any P ∈ (0, 1). Now, assume the above strategy profile to be an equilibrium strategy
profile. Now consider the following deviation: firm 1 enters when low cost and charges
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price p1LE = p
1
HE and p
1
LN = p
L. If firm 1 makes positive profit playing ‘enter’ in the
equilibrium being type H, then it must be true that it will make positive profit by playing
‘enter’ when it is type L. So this deviation is credible. Q.E.D.
2.8.0.11 Entry Strategy ((N,N),(NN))
The strategy profile ((N,N), (N,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not
form a part of a PSBNE of the game, G.
Proof: First, the belief of players in this section is given by (b1 = P, b2 = P) for any
P ∈ (0, 1). WLOG, consider any equilibrium price profile (p1LE , p1HE , (p1LN , p1HN ), (p2LE , p2HE ,
p2LN , p
2
HN ). Since every player’s strategy is to not enter irrespective of its type, consider
the following deviation by player 1; enter when type L and charge p1LE = p
L. The result-
ing profit in such a case is ΠL
−
which is greater than F . Thus this deviation is profitable.
Q.E.D.
2.8.0.12 Entry Strategies ((N,N),(E,E)), ((E,E),(E,N)),((N,E),(E,N)), ((N,N),
(E,N)), ((N,E),(E,E)), ((N,N),(N,E))
The strategy profile ((N,N), (E,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) forms
a part of a PSBNE of the game, G. This case is symmetric to case 2. The strat-
egy profile ((E,E), (E,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not form a
part of a PSBNE of the game, G. This case is symmetric to case 3. The strategy
profile ((N,E), (E,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not form a part
of a PSBNE of the game, G. This case is symmetric to case 4. The strategy pro-
file ((N,N), (E,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not form a part
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of a PSBNE of the game, G.This case is symmetric to case 5. The strategy profile
((N,E), (E,E), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not form a part of a PS-
BNE of the game, G. This proof is symmetric to case 7. The strategy profile ((N,N), (N,E),
(p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN , p
2
HN )) does not form a part of a PSBNE of the
game, G. This case is symmetric to case 9. Q.E.D.
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3.1. Introduction 3. Collusion with Private Information and Fixed Costs
3.1 Introduction
The wide presence of oligopolistic market structure and resulting strategic competition
among participating firms is one of the major reasons for the continued interest in this
particular field. Price being a major strategic variable in market competition has war-
ranted due attention under different market situations and with different market con-
straints. Since profit of identical firms competing a la Bertrand falls to ‘zero’ in a single
play of the game, a large body of literature is suggestive that firms in such a market
tend to contemplate collusion both in one-shot and repeated interactions on finite and
infinite horizons. Collusion has important anti-trust implications. A number of anti-
trust cases all over the world and across industries 1, and more recently, an upsurge of a
number of theoretical and empirical papers exploring the welfare effects of those collusive
practices[18], provide a strong evidence of the anti-welfare effects of collusion. possibility
of collusion as an equilibrium outcome2 has sparked interest among economists. Current
development of game theoretic tools like Nash Equilibrium and its application to games
with different information structures have proven to be very handy to identify the incen-
tive conditions for oligopolists to collude, which is an important benchmark in the theory
of oligopoly equilibrium 3. A large class of models, which have evolved from Green and
Porter (1984)[12], Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986)[1](hence forth APS1) and Fuden-
berg, Levin, Maskin(1994)[10](hence forth FLM) analyze situations where oligopolists face
a natural barrier to collusion when the strategic behavior of firms is imperfectly observ-
able. For example, in input markets firms negotiate their prices individually with their
suppliers and any information about this negotiation is mostly private information that
competitors do not observe [3]4. Even in cases where firm’s strategic decisions may be
publicly observable, firms might not have sufficient information about each other. In such
cases, it is not always clear if there can exist a separating equilibrium where firms may
truthfully reveal their private information and collude efficiently leading to a high profit
outcome. However, recent literature establishes that firms can rely on the realizations of
a public signal like price, published report of firms’ accounts etc. [19] as a part of their
strategy to enforce collusive equilibrium when they cannot monitor each others actions
directly. FLM and APS1 developed the related equilibrium concept which they defined
as a strategy profile where every firm’s strategy is dependent only on publicly observable
outcomes (called public history) and for each time period and that period public history
1For example the Alcoa Case, the Lysine Cartel, the Air Tours case and Airlines in EU, to name a few
2of course in repeated setting
3Conditions for the incentive to collude dates back to Chamberlin, i.e., the kinked demand curve solution
where collusion is being enforced by the threat of retaliation
4It might be interesting to see if suppliers can be incentivised to reveal truthful information to firms
about each other’s cost, but then it could not be truthfully verified.
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the strategy profile induces a Nash-equilibrium from that point on. Such equilibrium is
called Perfect Public Equilibrium (henceforth PPE ). But, imperfections in interpreting
the public signal do exist due to a number of exogenous factors like level of law enforcement
etc. . These imperfections often pose problems in the characterization of the (PPE)5 by
directly affecting the incentives among firms to collude. Several earlier papers have looked
into the issue of collusion among firms involving unknown costs in both repeated and
dynamic settings over both finite and infinite horizons. A subset of them discuss various
aspects of public monitoring and analyze its role in enforcing collusion. We discuss some
of these papers later in the literature review section.
In this paper, we propose two fundamental changes to the game that Athey and Bagwell
have analyzed in their 2001, 2004 (with Chris Sanchirico) and 2008 papers. First, we as-
sume a downward-sloping demand curve instead of a unit demand by consumers for a very
good reason that downward sloping demand is a better representation of the real world.
Secondly, we introduce an avoidable fixed cost into the firms’ cost structure that induces
firms make a decision to participate in the market before going on to competing in prices.
This makes firms participation in this game endogenous and the stage game changes to a
dynamic game, a major departure from Athey and Bagwell’s set-up. We explore, with the
changed conditions, the possibility of collusion among firms. We also analyze if it is harder
to collude in this set-up compared to a situation when there is no avoidable fixed cost. We
also analyze if productive efficiency (only the low cost firm producing in the market) can
be achieved and if it can sustain in the new circumstances. Finally, we explore if allowing
for pre-play communication facilitates collusion.The pre-play communication is introduced
to exchange information (make announcements) as a part of the commitment mechanism
in the collusive strategy of the players. In particular, players announce their cost types
before playing the entry and pricing strategies in the repeated game which they try to
verify later via a public signal mechanism. Without the pre-play communication, players
will have no chance to reveal their types and thus the collusive agreement to attain the
first-best outcome could not be facilitated6 Unlike Ziv (1993)[26], we assume no monetary
transfers between players.
3.2 Literature Review
Spulber (1995)[5] looked into a basic one-shot game of price competition with unknown
costs. He has shown that, with assymetric costs and other regularity assumptions, all but
5Note that a PPE is an analogous concept as SPNE where the strategy of players is dependent on the
observation of a public signal and thus the public history. It is a Nash equilibrium that induces a Nash
Equilibrium in a repeated game from any time t onwards.
6For a discussion see Chakrabarti (2010) [7]. We outline the details of this communication in the model.
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the highest cost firm expect positive profit when costs are unknown.
Compte (1988), Matsushima and Kandori (1998)[14], Matsushima (2001)[20], Cole
and Kocherlakota (2001) [8] and Kennan (2001)[15] have looked into different aspects of
collusive behavior in dynamic Bertrand games when there is private information. This
private information is generated by a random cost shock that firms receive every period
and as such states are privately observed by some of the players but not by all. Hanazono
and Yang (2007)[13] analyze collusive behavior when the firms receive private signals by
independently and identically distributed (IID) demand shocks affecting the demand side
of the market primarily. In a similar setting, Gerlach (2009)[11] designed a stochastic
market sharing rule to substitute for pre-play communication that is dependent on the
state of demand, in order for collusion to sustain when demand is fluctuating arbitrarily.
For example, in his model, partial communication in high demand states are sufficient in
order for firms to achieve the best and full communication collusive outcome since commu-
nication eliminates the possibility of opportunistic price cuts when demand is fluctuating.
In a series of papers, Athey and Bagwell (2001)[3] (2008)[5] and Sanchirico (2004)[4],
very rigorously discuss the possibility of collusion when firms cannot observe each others
costs. These papers use the market signal correlated with firms actions to characterize
jointly profit maximizing collusive equilibrium when firms are competing a la Bertrand and
when firms have private information about their own costs. In the 2001 paper, competing
firms 7 receive an IID shock about their cost types at the beginning of each period which
is private information. They characterize the Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) where
productive efficiency is achieved only when the high cost firm is willing to give up its
market share. Collusive equilibrium becomes most profitable in this situation when the
high cost firms are promised higher market share in future in order to implement efficiency
in the present period.
In the 2008 paper, existing firms in the market are assumed to play an infinite-horizon
version of the Bertrand price-setting game in which the prices are perfectly observed, firms
receive a private cost shock every period, but firms’ type remains persistent over time. It
is evident that this change in setting makes it a dynamic game. In this game cost shocks
are independent across firms, but within a firm cost shocks follow a first-order Markov
process. The paper shows that the firms can collude at the monopoly price by agreeing on
appropriate splits of the market share. The high-cost firm will be willing to give up market
share because it expects higher profit in the future. This result, however, as opposed to
the 2001 paper, does not depend crucially on the condition that a high-cost firm today
could receive a technology “shock” in the future that would make it a low-cost firm.
Athey and Bagwell (2008)’s main result indicates that if the distribution of costs is
7They use discrete types i.e. low-type and high-type
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log-concave and the firms are sufficiently patient, then price rigidity is supported in the
optimal collusive equilibrium, i.e., firms set the same price and share the market equally,
regardless of their respective costs. In their model, productive efficiency can be achieved
under some circumstances, but such equilibria are not optimal. It should, however, be
noted that the firms play a Bertrand price-setting game in each period and (this could be
a key factor that drives their results) the demand side is given by a unit mass of identical
consumers with a fixed reservation price (assumed to be strictly above the highest possible
marginal cost). This indeed makes the market sharing rule much more tractable than in
a case where a downward sloping demand schedule is assumed, since the firms know that
the reserve price is the optimal collusive price irrespective of the privately observed costs
of the firms. In particular when the demand is given by the usual downward sloping
demand curve, the optimal collusive price depends on the realized costs of the firms. In
these three papers by Athey and Bagwell and Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico, the authors
have used dynamic programming squared technique proposed by APS1, Abreu, Pearce
and Staccetti (1990)[2](henceforth APS2) and Fudenberg, Levin and Maskin (1994) [10].
These techniques provide a very efficient approach to modeling PPE by focusing on the
pay-offs rather than the strategy itself. However, they are useful when there exists a
unique stage game equilibrium in pure strategies which the firms can unequivocally bank
upon for a punishment strategy.
A later paper by Chakrabarti (2010)[7] models a similar situation in the case of Cournot
competing firms. However, he does not explicitly make use of the techniques that Athey
and Bagwell use and his conclusions are significantly different from Athey and Bagwell
(2008). He shows that, with signaling, the firms will play the strictly separating Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in period 1 and produce the optimal incentive compatible collusive quan-
tity vector from period 2 onwards. But with communication, the first period play of strictly
separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period 1 is no more optimal. He concludes that
the separating equilibria with communication yields larger pay-off among the two equilib-
ria he was considering.
Our work is well timed and placed in the literature in the sense that many of the
existence results that we use in our analysis in one-shot Bertrand games are still an active
area of research. This paper is organized in the following order. First, we present the
basic set-up of the model where we discuss the results of the stage game. Next, we present
the repeated game with imperfect public monitoring where we characterize a PPE that
results in efficient production (low cost firm producing). In the both the sections above
we consider that firms get an IID cost shock every period. Finally, in the last section, we
present a numerical example to illustrate the model.
60
3.3. Basic Set-Up 3. Collusion with Private Information and Fixed Costs
3.3 Basic Set-Up
We assume that two ex ante identical firms, 1 and 2, compete repeatedly in a standard
Bertrand model with homogeneous goods in periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The inverse demand
function D(p) satisfies regularity conditions D′(p) < 0 < D(p). Let pi,t ∈ R+ be the price
chosen by firm i ∈ {1, 2} in period t. Firms discount future with rate δ ∈ (0, 1) and we
use −i to represent convention.
We assume that every firm has a total cost function represented by
Ci,t(q) =
ci,tq + F, if enter0, otherwise
where F is an exogenous fixed cost 8 that a firm pays to participate in the market and
ci,t is its realized marginal cost in period t. Such fixed costs may be viewed as renewal of
licenses, leases etc. that businesses normally incur every year before they make pricing and
production decisions for the subsequent year. We assume that the marginal cost of firms ci,t
is a random variable with support {cL, cH}, cH > cL > 0 and prob(cL) = ηL < 12 . The
reason we assign this asymmetric probability to the cost types is to rid our model of any
mixed strategy equilibria and effectively use the PSBNE from the stage game equilibria
for our modeling purposes9. We call a firm to be of type L (or H) if it faces a marginal
cost cL (or cH). For convenience we will use cL(or cH) and L(or H) interchangeably. The
state space of types is represented here by Ω = {L,H} × {L,H} where Ωi = (L,H) are
realized from a common prior. For exposition, we assume that prob (cL) = ηL ∈ (0, 12),
which is common knowledge. Since we are also interested in examining the effect of pre-
play communication we allow for firms to announce their cost type before they engage
in price competition. Notice that every firm will have to announce its type here and not
announcing its type is not an option. Every firm i announces its type ai ∈ A ≡ {L,H}
where A is same across all firms. Thus the announcement space is A = A2.
The game follows a schedule every time period t in the following manner: (1) firms
observe their type, L or H (2) firms communicate with each other or engage in “Cheap
Talk” and make announcements ai = ψi(ci) where ψ
i(ci) is firm i’s announcement function
(we allow for such pre-play communication in order to examine if it facilitates collusion, an
important anti-trust issue) (3) firms make a decision to enter the market or not based on
their own announcement, ai, the announcement of other firms, a−i = ψ−i where a−i ∈ A
and the realization of their own type, ci. Denote a = (a
i, a−i) as the announcement vector
of all firms where a ∈ A and A is the space of announcements of all firms. We denote
8See Sutton (Chapter 1) for a detailed discussion [24]
9WLOG we have assumed ηL <
1
2
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the space of entry decision for firm i as Υi where Υi = {E,N} ≡ {E = enter, N =
not enter}. The entry decision function is ei(ci,a) : Ωi × A × A → Υi and we denote
the entry decision of firm i by υi ∈ Υi where υi = ei(ci,a). Denote υ = (υi, υ−i) where
υ ∈ Υ = (Υi,Υ−i) and Υ = Υi ×Υ−i = (E,N)× (E,N). Υ is the state space of entry
decisions pertaining to the available types. As is evident, in this set up, if a firm enters
it incurs a fixed cost of F . If a firm doesn’t enter, its profit is identically equal to ‘0’. (4)
Firms monitor each other’s entry decision and subsequently compete in price.
We describe the public monitoring mechanism that we will be using in our analysis.
Abreu, Pearce and Staccetti (1990) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) [10] have
done pioneering work in developing very powerful techniques to model repeated games
with imperfect public information using dynamic programming. A public monitoring
mechanism is essentially a signal that the players receive by observing a strategic variable
in the market. For example, Green and Porter identify price as the public monitoring
mechanism that firms use to monitor collusion while competing in Cournot. Another
example of such a monitoring is Team Production where players choose between high
effort or low effort. The probability of success of the project depends on the sum of
efforts of both players, but only the joint outcome is observed publicly. In a perfect public
monitoring firms can infer the correct actions from the public signal they observe which is
also equivalent to saying that firms can observe each other actions correctly. On the other
hand, in imperfect public monitoring, firms receive a noisy signal and the distribution
of the signal depends on the actions that firms take. We assume that the support of
the distribution of the public signal is constant across the set of all action profiles. This
definition of imperfect public monitoring can be directly extended to repeated games and
dynamic games. Mailath and Samuelson [19] represent the idea of public monitoring via
a public correlation device. Such device could capture the idea of a range of public events
that firms might use as a coordination mechanism which in essence captures the idea of a
public monitoring mechanism.
We now state our assumptions of the model.
Assumption 4. There exists a pˆ such that D(pˆ) = 0 and pˆ < ∞.
Assumption 5. There exists a price, p such that Di(p)p− cHDi(p)− F ≥ 0.
Let’s denote the optimal monopoly price, quantity and profit depending upon its cost
type by ΠL(ΠH), pL(pH), qL(qH) for types L(H). We also define ΠL
−
(ΠH
−
) = ΠL(ΠH)+
F .
Assumption 6. (1− ηL)ΠL− ≤ ΠH−, ΠH− > F .
Assumption 5 guarantees that there is sufficient demand in the market for a firm to
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operate at profit even if all the firms find that they have the highest possible marginal
cost. Assumption 6 specifies that the expected operating monopoly profit when a low cost
firm enters is less than the operating monopoly profit of a high cost firm. This assumption
allows us to reduce the multiplicity of equilibria using symmetric distribution on one side
of the inequality.
3.4 The Stage Game
We now describe the one-shot play of the stage game which forms the background for
our subsequent repeated extensive form game with incomplete information. We solve for
the Nash-Equilibriums in the stage game using the strategic trade-offs that the firms face
when making their entry decisions followed by their pricing decisions. First, we define the
strategy structure of the stage game as follows. Since announcements are “Cheap Talk”
in a one-shot game, we denote the entry strategy of firm i by ei(ci) : Ω
i → Υi since entry
is dependent on type of the firm only . Then the subsequent pricing strategy for firm i
can be defined as ρi(ci,υ) = Ω
i×Υi×Υ−i → R+ since a firm observes the entry decision
of all firms before making its pricing decision. We define an entry strategy profile in this
game as a vector e(c) ≡ (e1(c1), e2(c2)) where c ≡ (c1, c2) is the vector of realized cost
types of the duopolists. Finally, the pricing strategy profile can be represented by a vector
ρ(c,υ) = (ρ1(c1,υ), ρ
2(c2,υ)).
We denote the equilibrium pricing strategy profile by p∗ = (p1∗, p2∗) ∈ p∗ where both
p1∗, p2∗ are a six-tuple consisting of the entry strategy of the form ej∗ = (νjL, ν
j
H) ≡
(firm j’s entry decision when it realizes type L, firm j’s entry decision when it realizes
type H) when (νjL, ν
j
H) ∈ Υ, j ∈ {1, 2}, and pricing strategy of the form pj∗θ,γ where
(θ, γ) ∈ {L,H}×{E,N} ∈ Ωj ×Υ−j and pi∗θ,γ ≡ (price when type L and the other enters,
price when type L and the other does not enter, price when type H and the other enters,
price when type H and the other does not enter). Thus a full pricing strategy profile for
the one-shot stage game can be represented as follows.
((ν1L, ν
1
H), (ν
2
L, ν
2
H), (p
1
LE , p
1
LN , p
1
HE , p
1
HN ), (p
2
LE , p
2
LN , p
2
HE , p
2
HN ))
where p∗ ∈ R2+|Ωi×Υ−i|+|Ω−i×Υi|. Let’s assume pL, pH to be optimal monopoly prices for
type L and type H respectively. From the conditions above we can deduce that when
the rival, say firm 2, does not enter, then firm 1 sets its price at the monopoly price with
respect to its realized cost. Thus we will only be solving for the situations where both
firms enter and decide on the pricing strategy. Also, note that the entry strategy profiles
((N,E), (N,E)) and ((N,N), (N,N)) will only be considered as part of off-equilibrium
strategy profile of the subsequent repeated game since the former entry strategy profile is
63
3.4. The Stage Game 3. Collusion with Private Information and Fixed Costs
counter intuitive on incentive compatibility grounds and the latter leads to no production
in the market making it uninteresting from our modeling perspective.
Now we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.1. The stage game where Bertrand duopolists face symmetric discrete
cost uncertainty and an avoidable fixed cost, possesses two classes of Pure Strategy Per-
fect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) corresponding to the entry and pricing strategy profiles as
follows:
• Symmetric Equilibrium: In this equilibrium a type L firm always enters and a type H
firm stays out of the market. Notationally, ((E,N), (E,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN =
pH), (p2LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN = p
L, p2HN = p
H))
• Asymmetric Equilibrium: In this equilibrium, only one firm enters irrespective of its
type. Notationally, ((E,E), (N,N), (p1LE , p
1
HE , p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN = p
H)), (p2LE , p
2
HE , p
2
LN = p
L,
p2HN = p
H))
• No other entry strategy profile in this game forms a part of any pure strategy equilibrium in this
game, G.
Proof: See Patra, 2015[21].
From this proposition, it is obvious that the symmetric equilibrium strategy profile
((E,N), (E,N), (p1LE = cL, p
1
HE > cL, p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN = p
H), (p2LE = cL, p
2
HE >
cL, p
2
LN = p
L, p2HN = p
H)) constitutes a natural equilibrium of the game. This is the
most important result from our repeated game perspective. So p∗((E,N), (E,N)) =
((p1LE = cL, p
1
HE > cL, p
1
LN = p
L, p1HN = p
H)). The asymmetric equilibrium strategy
profile is an artificial one where a type H firm prices below cH when the rival firm has en-
tered. We use this result to motivate the penal code in our colussive equilibrium strategy
in the repated game that we analyze below.
Notice that, unlike Athey and Bagwell (2001[3] and 2008[4]), the stage game here is
an extensive form game and, in equilibrium, it possesses permanent inefficiencies where
either the market is not served with positive probability or the firm which always enters
earns a negative profit with positive probability.
Now we proceed to the infinitely repeated game10 . Our primary objective in this sec-
tion is to investigate production efficiency and collusive behavior among firms by allowing
for pre-game communication.
10another interpretation is that firms believe that the game will be played in the subsequent period with
positive probability
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3.5 The Repeated Game
In this section we define and analyze the repeated game. We also provide a theorem to
show the existence of a PPE that is production efficient.
3.5.1 Recursive Representation of the Stage Game
In the papers by Athey and Bagwell and Sanchirico that we have discussed earlier there
existed a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium (without any side payment possibilities) in the
stage game where p = E[m
i
in{mci}] where E is the Kolmogoroff Expectation Operator.
However, we have a multiplicity of equilibria (See the section on the stage game)in the
stage game we are considering due to the endogeniety of participation of firms. In this
repeated setting we include announcements, which did not explicitly appear in the one-
shot stage game due to the classic “Cheap Talk” argument. As we have discussed earlier,
we analyze whether announcements may facilitate collusion, an important concern for
anti-trust. Now we go on to define the firm strategies in the stage game of the repeated
game in the following manner. We represent the space of policies of a firm by
Si = {αi|αi : Ωi → Ai}×{ei : Ωi×Ai×A−i → Υi}×{ρi : Ωi×Ai×A−i×Υi×Υ−i → R}.
A typical policy for a firm i when its realized cost type is ci, firm j’s announcement a
j
and firm j′s entry decision ej is denoted by si(ci, ai, aj , υi, υj) = (αi(ci), ei(ci, ai, aj),
ρi(ci, a
i, aj , υi, υj)). Now, let’s assume c = (ci, c−i) where ci = cj , c−i = ck in state
(j, k) ∈ Ω, a = (ai, a−i), e = (ei, e−i) and υ = (υi, υ−i) where υi and ei represents the
announcement and entry decision of firm i. We also define several vectors here for future
use.
α(c) ≡ (αi(ci), α−i(c−i))
e(c,a) ≡ (ei(ci,a), e−i(c−i,a))
ρ(c,a,υ) ≡ (ρi(ci,a,υ), ρ−i(c−i,a,υ))
s(c,a) ≡ (si(ci, αi(ci), ei(ci,a), s−i(c−i, α−i(c−i), e−i(ci,a)))
The policy vector s(c) mentioned above determines the path of the game, i.e., it determines
announcements as well as the entry and price responses to these announcements. Thus
we can write down the stage game payoffs conditional upon the realization of types as
pii(s) = E
ci∈Ωi
[pii(s(c), ci)]. Since we are dealing with a duopoly here, i and −i can be
safely replaced by 1 and 2. We will be using this interchangeably for the rest of the game
without further declaration when we do so.
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Since we will be exploring the possibility of collusion among the duopolists during the
repeated play of the game we make a stop here to declare some of the quantities that form
a part of the expected return of firms every period they collude. We denote piL
−
= Π
L−
2
to represent the profit of a single firm when the duopolists realize cost cL enter the market
announcing type L, and collude at price pL to split the monopoly profit equally. The
quantity piH
−
= Π
H−
2 is defined analogously for type H. As indicated earlier, we discount
these payoffs by a factor δ ∈ (0, 1) per time period when we compute the present value of
the returns.
As we have mentioned earlier, firms do not have a direct monitoring mechanism in this
game and they use public signals to monitor the actions of their rival. Since a firm’s pay off
function is dependent on the history of publicly observable outcomes like announcements,
entry decisions and prices and not on any of their own private history, the solution concept
of a PPE seems applicable for this purpose11. Thus, before we go on to state the main
theorem, we would like to introduce some definitions and solution concepts for the type of
game we are considering. The solution concept we will primarily be using here is Perfect
Public Equilibrium where firms condition their strategy on realization of public signals.
3.5.1.1 Perfect Public Monitoring
We deal with perfect public monitoring as a special case of Imperfect Public Monitoring
that we define below.
3.5.1.2 Imperfect Public Monitoring
The concept of Imperfect Public Monitoring is very important in our analysis. Since
monitoring equilibrium action of players’ in this game is of primary importance, and
since there is no proper mechanism to monitor the type and policy function of the firms,
players in our game turn to a public signal in order to try inferring the strategy that
the rival actually played. We call this imperfect public monitoring. In repeated games
with Imperfect Public Monitoring (hence forth IPM), players information is a stochastic
public signal and the distribution of the public signal is dependent on the strategy profile
chosen by the firms. Let Y be the space for public signals and is finite, and the probability
that a public signal y ∈ Y is generated following a strategy profile s is µ(y|s). For a game
with perfect monitoring Y = A.
Also, like Athey and Bagwell (’01, ’04), we will not be analyzing mixed strategy profiles
in this game12 In our case even though the strategy profile is history dependent, since we
11the concept of sequential equilibrium by Kreps and Wilson[16] does not exclusive condition on the
public history
12This is purely for analytical purposes and to avoid cumbersome measurability details arising from a
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are assuming IID cost realizations over time t, some of the actions are not correlated
over time. To be precise, in this repeated game we try to detect if a firm has deviated
from a proposed equilibrium strategy and we use realizations of public signal to detect
such deviation13. Now, suppose si = (αi, ei, ρi) is an equilibrium strategy. A firm can
deviate from the equilibrium by choosing a deviant announcement, ai 6= αi(ci), a deviant
entry decision, υi 6= ei(ci), a price deviation pi 6= ρi(ci,a,υ) or any combination of
these deviations. All these deviations can be represented by alternative policy function
formulations, s˜i 6= si. Formally, we distinguish them into on-schedule and off-schedule
deviations. An on-schedule deviation is a deviation that is not observable to the players
during the equilibrium path of play. In the specific game that we are considering such a
deviation will come from what we call a mimicking deviation where a type H firm will
pretend to be type L, and share the market with type L. In terms of policy function, this
refers to a situation when a type H firm adopts the policy that the equilibrium specifies
for type L. Formally, s˜i specifies that cost type cj mimics type cˆj 6= cj , i.e., α˜i(cj) =
αi(cˆj), e˜
j(cj , α˜
i(cj)) = e
j(cˆj , α
i(cˆj)) and ∀a and ∀υ, ρ˜i(cj ,a,υ) = ρi(cˆj ,a,υ). Since
a low type firm has natural disincentives to mimic the high type in our setting, we will
only be considering cases where a high type firm mimics a low type. Thus, we will
also have to enforce the incentive compatibility for equilibrium announcement, price and
entry decisions in order to compute our continuation values. An off-schedule deviation
, on the other hand, is observable to the firms. They are defined as actions or a series
of actions that no cost type should adopt in equilibrium. For example, in our model,
decisions such as under-cutting the equilibrium price, entering the market when a firm
has announced type H are off-schedule deviations. As will be discussed later, this refers
to the deviation as “off-the-equilibrium-path” deviations. The current literature prescribes
harsh punishments for such a deviation in order to make it incentive compatible for firms
to play the collusive equilibrium14.
As has been indicated from the discussion above, since on-schedule deviations are not
observable, firms use a public signal (a signal that is generated by a mechanism/device that
deduces the cost of the rival firm by observing the rival firm’s published accounting profit,
its announcement, the demand function and an assumed tolerance for statistical errors and
compares the result to the announcement of the rival firm) for detection of deviation and
this is public information. In a simple sense this means that if a firm has played a strategy
that is not conforming with its true type then the machine will detect such a difference of
play with probability less than 1 (note that if such a play can be detected with probability
strategy profile being a mapping of the history (actions taken until that point) at a time period tand the
public realizations at the time period t to the current strategy profile.
13In the standard literature notion of a Public Correlation Device is employed in such situations
14In this case the literature uses mechanism design approach to deduce the participation constraints
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1, its the case of perfect information). However, if the rival has played the strategy
that conforms with its true cost type, then the mechanism will always detect fair play.
That is to say, the public signal mechanism can assign probability weights conditioning
upon an element from the state space of on-schedule deviating moves in any period Ξ =
(D,ND)× (D,ND) = (Deviation,No deviation)× (Deviation,No deviation) where for
every state (a, b) ∈ Ξ,‘a’ is firm i’s strategy and ‘b’ is firm −i’s strategy and (Deviation,
No Deviation)≡ (playing s˜i(cH , ., .), playing si(cL, ., .)). We denote the public signal in the
similar manner as the state space of deviations . µi represents the probability distribution
that firm i’s deviation will be detected given the action tuple of all firms in the market.
This probability assignment is symmetric and is public information.
µi(D|a) =
ηC if ai = D0 otherwise
where ηc ∈ (0, 1), a = (ai, a−i) ∈ Ξ and ai ∈ (D,ND). In the case of off-schedule
deviations ηC = 1 always. In our game, all firms have access to the public signal.
15
The most interesting thing with imperfect monitoring is that a firm might use this
to its advantage in order to deviate from a collusive equilibrium. However, note that in
the particular signaling mechanism that we have introduced earlier does not have a full
support, i.e., firms only initiate punishment when the rival in fact has deviated. In a
situation where the rival has not deviated the signaling mechanism will detect it with
probability 1 and such no punishment will be initiated. In a technical note, this signaling
mechanism helps us move away from the premises of APS1 and APS2 since it does not
satisfy the full support assumption of the signaling function. This plays a key role when
we design the collusive equilibrium.
Now we go on to describe the strategy of the repeated game. Clearly, we are dealing
with a game where continuation strategy of firms after a stage game is a function of public
monitoring and it does not condition on any private actions that firms take during the
stage game. Note that after the realization of the respective pay-offs in every stage game,
that stage game ends. Then, the firms observe the public signal before moving on to
the subsequent stage game. At the beginning of the subsequent stage game firms realize
their new type which is independent of the type they realized in the previous stage game.
Then firms play their stage game strategy as a mapping from their realized type and
announcement of their rival and proceed with subsequent strategies according to the time
line of the stage game set out earlier. Specifically, firms condition their strategy on the
history of realized announcements, entry decisions, price decisions and public signals and
15See appendix C for a helpful discussion.
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not on their private history of types or policy schedules. Such strategies are called Public
Strategies. We provide the following definition for Public Strategy.
Definition 3.5.1. Public Strategy: Let ht = (h0, h1, · · · , ht−1) be the t period public
history of firm i, i.e., a sequence of all publicly observed signals in the past. Every
ht is a 4-vector tuple, {at−1,υt−1,pt−1,yt−1} ∈ R|at−1 |+ |υt−1 |+ |pt−1 |+ |yt−1 | of realized
announcements, entry decisions, price decisions up to time period t and public signals
and every ht is a 4-tuple {at, υt, pt, yt}. Let the space of all public signals at period t as
Y t ⊂ Y and y ∈ Y .
Now, let Ht be the space of public histories ht at time t. We define the strategy of firm
i in period t as σti : H
t → Si where Si has the same meaning as before. We also denote
σt as period t strategy profile, σ as a sequence of strategy profiles over t = 1, · · · ,∞
and σi ∈ Σi, σ ∈ Σ and σ = (σi, · · · , σI). Finally, given history ht, we define per
period stage game payoff of firm i as pˆii(σt(ht)) and the expected payoff of the game as
E(
∑∞
t= 1 δ
t−1pˆii(σt(ht))) where h1 is a null set.
Having defined the strategy (which is a public strategy ) in this game, we now go on to
define the equilibrium concept associated with such strategy along the lines of Fudenberg,
Levin and Maskin (1994)[10](henceforth FLM) and APS2 in order to analyze the game.
The rationale for using this kind of equilibrium is the dependence of the strategy on public
realizations only. Since strategies are not necessarily public in the standard concept of
pure strategy Sequential Equilibrium proposed by Kreps and Wilson(1982)[16] and since
the full support assumption does not hold in our case (due to the fact that imperfect
detection mechanism that firms use assigns a positive probability to an unfavorable signal
only if (but not necessarily if) a deviation has occurred), we use Perfect Public Equilibrium
(PPE) as the equilibrium concept which we define below.
Definition 3.5.2. Perfect Public Equilibrium: A strategy profile σ∗ = (σi, ..., σI) is a
Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) if,
1. σ∗i is a Public Strategy for all i
2. For each date t and history ht the strategies are a Nash Equilibrium from that point
on. Formally,
Vi(σ
∗|ht) ≥ Vi(σi, σ∗−i|ht), ∀σi ∈ Σi,∀i.
Note that, unlike FLM and APS2 the use of PPE in our game is greatly simplified com-
pared to due to the nature of the monitoring mechanism we have discussed earlier. This
is because the monitoring mechanism we have is a composite function of public signals
generated by the actions taken by the firms, the application of the folk theorem provided
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by FLM becomes much simpler. As an aside, we divert away from the symmetric structure
of the response mechanism of the penal code by the punished firm and the punishing firm
that APS2 prescribes. Now we state the main result of our paper in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.1. Given that firms are sufficiently patient, there exists a Perfect Public
Equilibrium (PPE) in an infinitely repeated Bertrand Duopoly facing avoidable fixed cost
with imperfect public monitoring for a fixed cost F ≤ (1 − ηL)ΠH−. This equilibrium is
production efficient, i.e., in equilibrium only lowest cost firms enter and produce16 in the
market.
Proof: We provide our proof of this theorem by construction. First, we define the equi-
librium strategy in two parts; (1) A collusive agreement, (2) A penal code that enforces
the collusive agreement. Then we use standard tools from game theory to show that the
strategy outlined in part(1) constitutes such an equilibrium by the characterization of the
PPE.
Collusive Agreement: The collusive agreement in our Bertrand Duopoly game is out-
lined as follows.
(i) If both firms announce type L, both enter and set price pL and split the monopoly
profit equally. Each firm gets piL
− − F in this situation.
(ii) If one firm announces type L, only type L enters the market and sets price equal to
pL. In this case, this firm gets the whole market share and gets profit equal to ΠL
− − F .
(iii) If both firms announce type H, then both enter, set price equal to pH , and split the
monopoly profits equally. In this case each firm earns piH
− − F .
Notice that the collusive agreement aims to support productive efficiency of the firms while
optimizing the per period payoff of every firm in the repeated game17.
In order to enforce the above collusive agreement we need to design a credible penal
code. But before we do so, we take a moment here to discuss possible deviations and
monitoring mechanism in this game. As we have indicated earlier, firms in our game
depend on realization of public signals to detect deviation. This means, after firms have
played their set of actions in our stage game, a public signal is generated to exhibit if
a firm has deviated from the collusive agreement in that game or not, and this signal
becomes publicly visible such that all players notice if a particular firm has deviated or
not. As has been discussed earlier, we make a distinction between on-schedule and off-
schedule deviations here. As we have indicated in section 5.1.2 firm is said to deviate
16Note that the lowest cost firm in this case is with respect to the firms’ announcement and as such it
does not have to be of type L. For example, if both firms declare type H, then the lowest cost firm is type
H
17see appendix E for further discussion on this.
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off-schedule if it chooses an action or a combination of actions in the stage game that is
not specified for any cost realization. For example, in our game, price under-cutting by a
firm is an example of such deviation. As we have indicated, in our monitoring mechanism,
an off-schedule deviation can be detected with probability ‘one’. This means that, with
probability ‘one’, the public signal will visibly indicate that a firm has deviated when it has
deviated off-schedule. The standard literature prescribes the worst available punishment
to deter this kind of deviation. On the other hand, an on-schedule deviation occurs
when a firm chooses an action or a combination of actions that are not prescribed for its
own type, but for some other existing type. In our game a mimicking deviation is an
example of such deviation. The actions are thus “on-the-equilibrium-path”. The standard
way to prevent this kind of deviation is to play the worst possible Nash equilibrium as a
credible threat. But, such a Nash Equilibrium does not exist in our game for the level of
fixed cost F we are considering. However, since the specific public monitoring mechanism
available in our game can detect such on-schedule deviation with probability ηC ∈ (0, 1)
via a public signal, we could also use the worst available punishment here just as we do
for an under-cutting to the lowest possible cost cL when the deviant enters as a threat to
deter such on-schedule deviation. Therefore, under proper mechanism, we will be using
this worst available pricing as threat against all kinds of deviation.
Now we prescribe the penal code to explain the punishment mechanism and we will sub-
sequently derive the incentive compatibility constraints.
Penal Code:
(a) If the public signal positively detects an on-schedule or off-schedule deviation, the
strategy of the punishing firm and the deviating firm are as follows.
(i) Punishing firm: Enters the market every subsequent period irrespective of its cost type.
If the deviating firm has entered, punishing firm sets price equal to cL. Else, the punishing
firm charges monopoly price with respect to its type. Note that the punishing firm would
like to floor the price to the lowest possible marginal cost in the market in order to ensure
that the rival faces a loss for sure if it enters the market, irrespective of its cost type.
(ii) Deviating firm: Stays out of the market for every subsequent period. If it enters during
the punishment phase then it sets its price equal to its marginal cost which is apparently
its dominant strategy irrespective of its type.
(b)If no deviation is detected:
Every firm plays according to the initial collusive agreement.
In order to support this penal code we deduce the incentive compatibility constraints
in the following section.
Incentive Compatibility Constraints:
As mentioned earlier, we use standard tools from the literature to characterize the con-
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tinuation value function and the present-value expected return to derive the incentive
compatibility constraints. Even though we are using the solution principle of dynamic
programming squared via characterizing a Bellman operator as a function of an endoge-
nous Bellman operator, we have not made an explicit exposition of the technique here.
This is due to the very reason that the public monitoring mechanism is deterministic in our
program. But this model can be extended to a non-deterministic public monitoring set-up
where we replace our public signaling mechanism by a mechanism with simple public cor-
relation with minor changes in the notation and introducing some additional definitions
as well as operators. Such modeling will condition the actions on the PPE pay-offs and
not on public monitoring directly which is not the case here. So we proceed as follows.
We define:
V =
[
η2Lpi
L + ηL(1− ηL)ΠL + (1− ηL)ηL.0 + (1− ηL)2piH
]
where piL = piL
−−F and piH = piH−−F . Notice here that V is the expected stage game
pay-off of a firm in our repeated game when they are playing the game according to the
collusive agreement. Now we can write down the incentive compatibility constraints as
follows.
IC-1: (Under-cutting being type L): (1− δ)ΠL ≤ V .
As we have discussed earlier, an under-cutting deviation occurs when both firms enter
after both declaring type L and one sets a price equal to pL − ,  > 0 to win the whole
market. Since this is an off-schedule deviation this will be detected with probability ‘one’.
As a result, according to the prescribed penal code, the deviating firm will be earning no
profit after such a deviation.
IC-2: (Under-cutting being type H): (1 − δ)ΠH ≤ V . This constraint is analogous to
IC-1, but for type H duopolists.
IC-3: (Mimicking): (1 − δ)pic + δ(1 − ηC)V ≤ V where pic = (pL − cH) qL2 − F is the
profit of the mimicking firm. We note here from a quick inspection that all incentive
compatibility constraints including IC-2 are satisfied when IC-1 and IC-3 hold. For future
use, let’s denote pic
−
= (pL − cH) qL2 .
Solving the constraints yields us
ΠL − V
ΠL
≤ δ ≤ 1.
As is evident the left limit of the δ, it is a decreasing function of the expected value from
playing collusion V and an increasing function of the lost cost monopoly profit ΠL. This
shows that collusion becomes easier when the ratio between V and ΠL are increasing since
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firms do not have to be very patient to play the punishment. This shows that for the
above value of δ, the incentive compatibility constraints hold in order for the designed
penal code to be credible which in turn supports the aforesaid collusive equilibrium. 
3.6 Numerical Example
For a simple exposition of the model, consider a linear inverse demand function of the
market given by Q = A − P and we assume the market organization, time-line of the
game as described in the previous sections. As before, we assume that every firm pays
identical fixed cost F to enter the market. Firms realize cost types with the following
distribution; P(cL) = 1/3 and P(cH) = 2/3, where P is the probability operator. Then,
the profits, following the description of the game above and maintaining the terms as
defined in the game, can be calculated to be:
ΠL
−
=
(A− cL)2
4
; piL
−
=
ΠL
−
2
=
(A− cL)2
8
; piL = piL
− − F = (A− cL)
2
8
− F
ΠH
−
=
(A− cH)2
4
; piH
−
=
ΠH
−
2
=
(A− cH)2
8
; piH = piH
− − F = (A− cH)
2
8
− F
and
pic
−
=
(A− cL)(A+ cL − 2cH)
8
;
where pL = A+cL2 , q
L = A−cL2 .
Now for the equilibrium we are considering, ((E,N), (E,N)), we will need to satisfy
the conditions 23Π
L− − F > 0; 23ΠH
− − F < 0 (see appendix D for a helpful discussion),
for the Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game to hold. Note that we showed previously,
that PPE holds automatically when F falls in the following bounds that we obtain by
combining the two conditions above.
2
3
(A− cL
2
)2
> F >
2
3
(A− cH
2
)2
.
As we have discussed in the theorem 5.1, we also explore the possibility of collusion when
2
3
(A− cH
2
)2
> F.
Solving from the IC constraints as defined in the characterization of PPE, it is immediate
that the PPE holds when δ is in the following bounds.
13
18
− 2
9
(
1 +
cL − cH
A− cL
)2
≤ δ ≤ 1.
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The following diagram represents this relationship.
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Figure 3.1: CLvsDelta
3.7 Efficiency of the PPE
Here we discuss the efficiency of our PPE by focusing on the feasibility of production at
different fixed cost levels while maintaining efficiency. We proceed with the discussion in
a case by case basis.
1. σ∗|ht = ((E,N), (E,N),p∗,y ∈ Y ) when (1−ηL)ΠH− ≤ F ≤ (1−ηL)ΠL− . Clearly,
this can be supported as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game since we deduced
earlier that this strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot stage
game. As long as F is within these bounds firms can continue playing the stage
game strategy profile irrespective of the announcements and monitoring mechanism
for infinite time periods. It is obvious that this will constitute a PPE of the repeated
game.
2. If F > (1− ηL)ΠL− then no one enters the market, i.e., play (σ∗|ht) = ((N,N),
(N,N),p∗,y ∈ Y ). This strategy is self explanatory since the fixed cost is too high
for any type of firm to earn positive expected profit in any situation.
3. If F < (1 − ηL)ΠH− , both firms expected profits are larger than the fixed cost.
So every firm would like to enter even though production efficiency will be sacri-
ficed. However, as we discovered in our one-shot dynamic game the entry strategy
((E,E), (E,E)) and the related pricing strategy p∗((E,E), (E,E)) cannot be a part
of the Nash equilibrium profile. Thus, this poses a problem in order for the strategy
profile σ∗|ht = ((E,E), (E,E),p∗,y ∈ Y ) to be a PPE. The problem is also ampli-
fied since a mimicking deviation from the collusive agreement could only be partially
detected by the monitoring mechanism in this game. So firms of type H will find it
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profitable to enter the market mimicking the strategy of a type L firm, since there
is a chance it will go undetected. However, we show that the penal code designed
above prevents such deviation in this repeated game. We use a much simpler vari-
ant of the folk theorem proposed by Fudenberg, Levin and Maskin (1994) for this
purpose. Note that the simplicity is due to the specific form of public monitoring
mechanism we use in this game.
3.8 Conclusion
The proposition, the theorem and the example provided above exhibits that, if firms are
sufficiently patient, it is possible for them to collude in a repeated Bertrand duopoly when
the cost types are discrete and the firms do not know each other’s costs. The monitoring
mechanism we have chosen plays an important role in designing a penal code that firms
can use as a credible threat in order to enforce the collusive equilibrium. A feature of this
mechanism is the asymmetric action of the punishing firm and the deviating firm when the
penal code is enforced, which differs from standard APS2 and FLM literature. Secondly,
due to the existence of avoidable fixed cost, it becomes possible for firms to collude in
our set-up which is a new result compared to the existing literature on repeated as well
as one-shot Bertrand games incorporating avoidable fixed costs. Added to this, when
costs are unknown and firms depend on a public signal to monitor each other’s action,
collusion mostly depends on the probability distribution of the types and the probability
of detection. With imperfection in detection, if the probability of realizing a high type
increases, collusion becomes harder since a firm which realizes low cost would undercut
with a higher probability since it will expect the other firm to be high type with increased
probability. Moreover, when the difference between the costs increase, the low cost firm
will find it easy to initiate punishment and the high cost firm will find it very harsh to
do so. Finally, our model preserves efficient production by the duopolists in this collusive
equilibrium which could not be achieved without incorporating fixed cost into the model.
In our model, only the lowest cost types enter following announcements and produce as
long as the game is played. Special mention must be made here about the situation when
both firms announce type H and enter the market to collude. Since, there is no firm with
a lower cost type in the market, production by the high type indeed preserves efficiency
and welfare in the market as compared to staying out.
We note here that, unlike Athey and Bagwell(2001)[3] we do not consider unequal
market sharing agreements and quantity restriction by firms in this model to model the
penal code for the on-schedule deviations in the equilibrium path. We abstract away
from such a model due to our innovation of the specific public signaling device which is
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different from the simple public correlation mechanism by Athey and Bagwell (2001)[3].
However, it will be an interesting avenue to pursue to include simple public correlation
mechanism in our model. As another direction, it will also be interesting to look at a
situation when the costs are persistent over time. In such situation, with the inclusion
of fixed cost, collusion may become harder since firms with low costs may predate than
collude when they decide to enter. Persistence of costs will also covert the repeated game
into a dynamic game with hidden state variable, a model that was developed by Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001)[8]. We can also look at situations where firms could strategically
undertake prior investments in order to influence their cost type in future play of the
game. This model can be extended to continuum of types and it will be interesting to see
if the results hold in a Cournot set-up. Finally, it will also be interesting to explore when
firms pay just a one time fixed cost before the repeated play of the Bertrand game with
unknown costs.
Our model is novel in the sense that it is a step forward in the direction of endogenous
participation of firms and inclusion of avoidable fixed costs in Bertrand games, an area in
economics that is not fully developed yet. This model is intended to serve as an anecdote
to many other interesting issues arising from such endogeniety in market decision making.
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4.1. Introduction 4. Bertrand Competition with One-sided Cost Uncertainty
4.1 Introduction
Due to the existence of the fundamental discontinuity in the profit functions of Bertrand
competing firms with homogeneous product with bounded price many existence results
are still an active area of research. The classical outcome of competitive profit when firms
with symmetric constant marginal cost compete one-shot in prices while having perfect
information about each other has been difficult to replicate in different informational
and cost setting. For example, when both firm’s costs are unknown, Spulber (1995)
[5] has shown that, with parameterized asymmetric costs, all but the highest cost firm
expect positive profit when costs are drawn from a continuous distribution. Baye and
Kovenock (2008) [1] showed that with a fixed cost and constant marginal cost of firms
there exists a mixed strategy Nash-equilibria in the full information Bertrand game. They
argue that the reason for this existence is that the cost function in this case essentially is
concave. Blume(2003)[2], in a seminal paper has indicated that when Bertrand duopolists
have different constant marginal costs, have perfect information about each other and
the highest marginal cost is below the monopoly price of the lowest cost firm, then in
equilibrium the low cost firm will charge a price equal to the higher marginal cost and the
higher cost firm would randomize between the two costs. However, observe that this is
again a partial mixed strategy equilibrium. In a recent paper, Routledge [4] (2010) showed
that in a classical model of Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods and constant
marginal costs, only a mixed strategy Nash-equilibrium exists when the marginal costs
are unknown and there is symmetric tie-breaking rule.
Unlike these prior studies, we assume that the cost type of one firm is unknown,
and that the cost types are asymmetric between firms. The assumptions reflect real life
competitions among firms. We characterize the full equilibrium, and show that pure
strategy Nash equilibrium can exist in some cases.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model set-up. Section 4.3
provides the full characterization of the equilibrium and finally, Section ?? concludes the
paper.
4.2 The Model
Two firms, each indexed by i ∈ N := {1, 2}, are engaged in a Bertrand price competition
with homogeneous goods and equal rationing rule. That is, firms compete by setting their
prices simultaneously and independently. Firms that set the lowest price serve all the
demand. In case of the tie, firms share the demand equally.
The inverse demand function D : R+ → R+ satisfies the following properties. First,
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there exists a “choke-off price” pmax ∈ R+ such that D′(p) < 0 < D(p) for all p ∈ (0, pmax)
and that D(p) = 0 for all p ∈ [pmax,+∞). Second, D is continuous on the entire domain
R+ and twice continuously differentiable on (0, pmax). We denote qmax := D(0).
Firm 1’s marginal unit cost is publicly known to be c1. Firm 2, on the other hand,
privately observes its own marginal unit cost c2 which can take two values cL and cH
with probability ηL and 1 − ηL, respectively. We call firm 2 to be of type L (H) if it
faces a marginal cost cL (cH) and we assume 0 < cL < cH < p
max. The profit function
of a firm is given by pij(p) := (p − cj)D(p) for each p ∈ R+ and for each j ∈ {1, L,H}.
As is standard, we assume that (p − cj)D(p) is strictly concave in price p over [0, pmax].
We denote by pmj , q
m
j , and pi
m
j , the monopoly price, quantity, and profit, respectively, for
each cost realization: pmj := argmaxp∈R+ pij(p), q
m
j := D(p
m
j ), and pi
m
j = pij(p
m
j ) for each
j ∈ {1, L,H}. Note that pmj is well-defined and unique for each j ∈ {1, L,H}. Each firm
maximizes its expected profit.
The Equilibrium Concept we use in this analysis is the Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (PSBNE) of this Bertrand game. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in this game
is a triple (p∗1(c1) ≡ p∗1, p∗2(cL) ≡ p∗L, p∗2(cH) ≡ p∗H) where p∗1(c1) is the price that firm 1
sets, p∗2(cL) is the price that a type L firm 2 sets and p∗2(cH) is the price that a type H
firm sets in equilibrium. We denote by E∗ the set of pure strategy PSBNE.
4.3 The Full Characterization of PSBNE
Lemma 4.3.1. No firms price below their marginal cost.
Proof. Pricing below marginal costs will generate a negative profit, if the firm wins the
competition. Because the game is static, the firm cannot gain future benefits. Such
strategy violates the individual rationality constraint, because the firm can always produce
nothing.
Proposition 4.3.1. If c1 < cL, then E
∗ = {(cL, pL, pH) | pL > cL, pH > cL}.
Proof. First, according to Lemma 4.3.1, firm 1 prices at or above c1. Second, as long as
firm 1 sets price above cL, type L firm 2 optimally responds by cutting price by a small
 and captures the whole market.1 Given any pricing strategy of type L firm 2, firm 1 is
willing to undercut type L firm 2 as long as capturing the entire market generates higher
expected profit than pricing at pm1 (assuming p
m
1 ≤ cH) but losing the market when facing
1The monopolistic price of firm 1 in this case is lower than that of type L firm 2, which follows from
our model assumptions.
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type L firm 2. Thus the optimal strategy for firm 1 depends on the monopolistic price
pm1 . We discuss below in detail.
Case 1 (pm1 ∈ [c1, cL)): Observe that if firm 1 sets its price in the interval [c1, cL) then
firm 1’s optimal price would be to set p1 = p
m
1 . Then, both type L and type H firm 2
would set their respective prices strictly above p1. Given the best response of both types
of firm 2, firm 1 does not have any profitable deviation, which satisfies the conditions for
an equilibrium.
Case 2 (pm1 = cL): Consider firm 1 setting a price p1 = p
m
1 = cL. In such a case
a type L firm 2 would best respond by charging price pL ≥ cL and and a type H firm 2
would set pH > cL, both types of firm 2 making a ‘zero profit’. If a type L firm 2 chooses
a price at cL, Firm 1 in will make a profit of
1
2(cL − c1)D(cL). But firm 1 can profitably
deviate to charging a price cL −  and making monopoly profit, given the best responses
of firm 2 irrespective of its type. Thus (pm1 , cL, pH) cannot be a PSBNE. Now consider the
possibility when a type L firm 2 charges a price pL > cL. In such a case, firm 1 will have
no profitable deviation since it is making monopoly profit by charging cL and given that
both types of firm 2 are best responding by charging strictly above pm1 = cL. A type H
firm 2 is making a ‘zero’ profit in this strategy profile. In order to gain any market share a
type H firm 2 will have to price below cL but earn negative profit in such a case. So a type
H firm 2 does not have a profitable deviation given the pricing strategy of firm 1. Finally,
when a type L firm 2 sets its price pL > cL, it receives no market share and as such receives
an expected profit of ‘zero’ which is no less than what it receives when it sets a price on
or below cL. Thus the pricing strategy profile E
∗ = (p∗1 = pm1 = cL, p∗L > cL, p
∗
H > cL)
is an equilibrium strategy profile when (pm1 = cL).
Case 3 (pm1 > cL): For this case, we first inspect if there exists an equilibrium pricing
strategy profile such that p∗1 ∈ (cL, cH). Given p∗1, type L firm 2 will optimally undercut
firm 1. The expected profit of firm 1, given that type L firm 2 undercuts, is (1− ηL)(p∗1−
c1)D(p
∗
1), which implies p
∗
1 = p
m
1 . The question becomes, does firm 1 undercuts type L
firm 2? The indifference condition is
(1− ηL)(pm1 − c1)D(p∗m) = (ps1 − c1)D(ps1),
where Firm 1 is willing to undercut only to ps1.
If ps1 < cL, then type L firm 2 prices at cL and firm 1 prices at marginally below cL. If
type L firm 2 prices above cL, firm 1 optimally responds by pricing below type L firm 2.
Iterative argument implies that firm 2 prices at cL. Given firm 2’s strategy, firm 1 prices
at marginally below cL.
If ps1 ≥ cL, then type L firm 2 prices at cL, but firm 1 prices at min{max{cL +
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, ps1}, cH − }.
Proposition 4.3.2. If c1 = cL, then E
∗ = ∅.
Proof. Notice that if firm 1 sets a price below c1 in equilibrium then it would obtain a
negative profit. A profitable deviation for firm 1 would be to charge a price on or above
c1. In addition, firm 1 cannot also charge a price above cH . Doing so results in being
undercut by firm 2 irrespective of its type. So the only interesting case to look at is the
pricing between [cL, cH ].
Firm 1 obtains positive profit, because it can set a price in (cL, cH) to win the market
when firm 2 draws a high type. Then, firm 2 with low type must also obtain positive
profit. If not, firm 2 with type L can profitably deviate by taking pL ∈ (cL, p1]. This
implies that p1 = pL(> c1). It is, however, impossible because each firm can profitably
deviate by slightly undercutting. Hence, the game does not have a PSBNE.
The result is striking since by pricing larger than cL, firm 1 can earn positive expected
profit. Given firm 1’s strategy, firm 2 of type L always wants to marginally undercut firm
1. Given this best response by firm 2 of type L, it is always marginally better for firm 1
to lower its price further to capture the market. This is a profitable deviation for firm 1
since for any given price of firm 2 of type L, the expected profit when not undercutting is
piH(p1 − cL)D(p1) where p1 = pL + , which is always smaller than the expected profit if
firm 1 undercuts is (p1−cL)D(p1). The result hinges crucially on the assumption that firm
1 has the same cost as firm 2’s lower type, i.e., c1 = cL (see the next case). It also depends
on the assumption that firm 2 takes firm 1’s strategy as given and does not account for
the effect of its deviation on firm 1’s response.
Proposition 4.3.3. If c1 ∈ (cL, cH), then
E∗ =
{(pm1 , pmL , pH) | pH > pm1 } if pmL < pm1 ≤ cH∅ if pmL < pm1 and cH < pm1 .
Proof. As is in the previous case, in equilibrium it must be the case that cL ≤ pL ≤
cH ≤ pH . The first and third inequalities are due to participation constraints. The second
inequality is due to firm 1 will undercut if both types of firm 2 set price larger than cH .
For firm 1, it must be that c1 ≤ p1 ≤ cH .
We discuss two cases. First, p1 ≥ pmL . Since the costs of the two firms are different,
firm 2 does not necessarily want to set the price right below the price of firm 1. We explain
this result below.
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In this case, it is optimal for firm 2 to set price pL = p
m
L . The reason is p1 ≥ pmL ,
so firm 2 of type L captures the market and earns monopolistic profit. Given this, the
question is whether firm 1 has incentive to deviate. Firm 1 prefers to deviate from p1 if
and only if (1 − ηL)(p1 − c1)D(p1) ≤ (pmL − c1)D(pmL ).The break-even price, if it exists,
must be larger than pmL since 1 > piH > 0 and p
m
1 > p
m
L . Call this price p
s
1. If p
s
1 exists,
then firm 1 will NOT deviate by undercutting. If ps1 does not exist, firm 1 will deviate by
undercutting and this goes on until price reaches c1 but given c1, firm 1 would want to
deviate to earn positive profit.
In this case, pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a price
such that piH(p1c1)D(p1) = (p
m
L c1)D(p
m
L ), which is equivalent to piH(p
m
1 c1)D(p
m
1 ) >
(pmL c1)D(p
m
L ) if p
m
1 < cH and piH(cHc1)D(cH) > (p
m
L c1)D(p
m
L ) if p
m
1 ≥ cH . Firm 1
charges p1 = min{pm1 , cH}. Firm 2 charges its monopolistic price.
Second, p1 < p
m
L . Then firm 2 of type L will deviate by undercutting firm 1. This goes
on until price is at c1 in which case firm 1 will deviate. Hence there is no pure strategy
NE.
Proposition 4.3.4. If c1 = cH , then E
∗ = {(p1, pL, pH) | p1 ≥ c1, pL < p1, pH ≥ cH}.
Proof. Consider p1 < cL. Then, both types of firm 2 would best respond by pL, pH > p1.
Now consider p1 = cL. Then a type L firm 2 would best respond with pL ≥ c1 [?] and
a type H firm 2 would best respond with pH > c1. Now, consider firm 1 charging a
price p1 ∈ (cL, cH). In such a case, a type L firm 2 would best respond by pL = p1 − 
and a type H firm 1 would best respond by pH > cH . Given the best responses in the
above cases, firm 1 would earn a negative expected profit 2. However, firm 1 can profitably
deviate in all the aforesaid cases by charging a price p1 ≥ cH where it can earn a minimum
expected profit of ‘zero’. So we establish that in equilibrium firm 1 would not set a price
p1 < cH . Now, consider firm 1 setting p1 > cH . Then firm 2 would best respond with
p1 −  irrespective of its type leading firm 1 to earn a ‘zero’ profit 3. In such a case,
firm 1 setting a p1 = min{pL, pH} −  would be a profitable deviation. Using standard
Bertrand argument of spiral undercutting of prices, any price strictly above cH would
yield a profitable deviation for firm 1. So the only surviving candidate price is p1 = cH .
Now, consider p1 = cH . In such a case a type L firm 2 would best respond by pL < p1
and a type H and a type H firm 2 would best respond with pH ≥ cH . Now consider the
pricing strategy profile {(p1, pL, pH) | p1 = c1 = cH , pL = cH − , pH ≥ cH}. Observe
that, given this pricing profile no firm will have any profitable deviation. So, this is a
Nash-equilibrium pricing strategy profile.
2Since firm 1 would make a positive sale when firm 2 is type H, which occurs with positive probability.
In the case firm 2 is type L firm 1 would earn a zero profit.
3observe that this result holds irrespective of the location of the monopoly price of both the cost types
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Proposition 4.3.5. If c1 > cH , then E
∗ = {(p1, cH , pH) | p1 > cH , pH ≥ cH}.
Proof. Using the arguments from the previous section it is immediate that p1 ≮ cL in
equilibrium. Now consider p1 = cL. In such a case a type L firm 1 will best respond by
setting pL ≥ p1 and a type H firm 2 will best respond by pH > p1. In this case firm 1
would earn a negative profit. But firm 1 can set its price at c1 and make a ‘zero’ profit
which is a profitable deviation. So in equilibrium it must be that p1 6= cL. Now consider
p1 ∈ (cL, cH). In this case firm 2 will best respond with pL = p1− and pH > p1. Arguing
similarly as the last section we can conclude that firm 1 will not set a price p1 ∈ (cL, cH)
in equilibrium. Now consider p1 = cH . In this case pL = p1 −  and pH ≥ p1. Observe
that in expectation, firm 1 will also gain positive market share in this situation and earn
negative profit. As such, firm 1 can profitably deviate by setting p1 = c1. Now consider
firm 1 setting p1 ∈ (cH , c1). In this case both types of firm 2 will undercut p1, forcing firm
1 to earn zero profit. Observe that firm 1 can consider deviating only by setting a larger
p1. But in such a case this price will be undercut and firm 1 will earn ‘zero’ profit. So
there is no strictly profitable deviation for firm 1. So we can conclude that in equilibrium
firm 1 will set p1 ≥ c1. Now consider an equilibrium price p∗1 = c1. Given this, both
firm 1 and firm 2 would charge a price pL = pH = p
∗
1 − . In such a case firm 1 would
earn a ‘zero’ profit by not earning any market share. Continuing with that argument,
consider the pricing profile (p∗1 = c1, p∗L = p
∗
H = min{c1, pmL }). Its clear that there is no
profitable deviation for any firm in this since firm 2 will always gain the market and firm
1 will always price weakly above its marginal cost.
4.4 Conclusion
We have provided a full characterization of the pure strategy equilibrium in a standard
Bertrand game with one-sided cost uncertainty. We find that one-sided cost uncertainty
and bounded known cost type are sufficient to guarantee the existence of the PSBNE in the
Bertrand game when costs of one firm is a stochastic draw from some known distribution.
Note that when the cost of the certain firm type (firm 1 in our case) matches the lowest cost
of the uncertain type (firm 2 in our case) there is no equilibrium. This is a strong feature
of our equilibrium which is not present in a standard Cournot game in similar setting [3].
This is largely due to the fact that price as a strategic variable is quite sensitive to the cost
of a firm than quantity as such. In a Cournot game the firm with uncertain types takes
advantage of the fact that it can change its production according to its cost type while
the certain type cannot change the information about its cost and as such production. So
while the certain type will be making its decision about the quantity level in expectation,
the uncertain type will be able to make a more informed decision than the certain type
85
4.4. Conclusion 4. Bertrand Competition with One-sided Cost Uncertainty
which basically drives the equilibrium result. Note that, there is no real effect of the order
of costs in the Cournot game on its equilibrium characterization.
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Chapter 5
Statistical Fluctuations along the
Lennard-Jones Melting Curve
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Any thermodynamic system over time exhibits a distribution of thermodynamic state
variable values which depend on the ensemble adopted. Such fluctuations in first order
thermodynamic quantities can be used as a route to calculate second order thermodynamic
quantities (e.g ., heat capacity and compressibility), and they have been used in molecular
simulation studies over many decades to perform this task, [1]. Relatively recently a new
use for system property fluctuations has been proposed, and that is to identify those states
on the phase diagram that have (to a good approximation) an underlying scale invariance
which has been called isomorphism, [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 2] because of similar underlying assembly
structures of these thermodynamic state points. Consider a point in the configurational
phase space of N molecules which may represent the molecules in a periodic simulation
periodic cell, where ri is the coordinate of molecule i, and the configurational phase state
point is represented in concise form by, rN ≡ r1r2 · · · rN . If ρ is the number density of
molecules, and r˜i ≡ ρ1/3ri is a non-dimensionalised coordinate, two state points on the
phase diagram (e.g ., defined by density and temperature) are said to be isomorphic if the
probability distribution function of these states, P (r˜N ), for all r˜N in the two thermody-
namic state points are the same. By extension an isomorphic line on the phase diagram
(typically, defined by the density and temperature points) is one along which all state
points have the same P (r˜N ).
Assuming pair-wise additivity of the potential energy surface, the analytic form of the
pair potential is, in addition to the density and temperature, the most important factor
in controlling the extent of isomorphic behaviour. The Lennard-Jones (LJ) potential is
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one of the most used classical representations of model condensed phase systems, and is
defined by, φLJ(r) = 4[(σ/r)
12 − (σ/r)6], where  and σ define the characteristic energy
of interaction and diameter of the molecule, respectively, and r is the separation between
the centres of two of the molecules. The inverse power potential, φIP (r) = 4(σ/r)
n, is
another relevant potential in the present context, where n is an exponent which governs
the steepness of the potential. The inverse power (IP) fluid and solid are examples of
perfectly isomorphic condensed phases in which the isomorphic line is defined through the
relationship, ρn/3/T = const, where T is the temperature (using the usual molecule-based
reduced units). The LJ potential is the sum of two such inverse power terms, and the
n = 12 IP fluid or solid could be considered to be a possible reference system for the
LJ system, and the n = 6 IP attractive part of the potential is taken to be a first order
perturbation.
The ‘melting line’ on the phase diagram is where a transition between a fluid and solid
(crystalline) state takes place. In fact it is only a line when plotted in the P, T plane,
where P is the pressure. On the ρ, T and ρ, P planes, there are coexisting region ‘gaps’
between distinct fluid and solid single phase zones. Knowledge of the melting line (ML) of
a chemical system is important in various chemically relevant fields as the physical state
of the molecules can have a strong influence on the physical behaviour (e.g ., flow char-
acteristics) of the system. This is important in, for example, geology and high pressure
(elastohydrodynamic) lubrication. The melting line is already known to be almost iso-
morphic, which in part explains the success of various phenomenological ‘rules’ of melting
for many different types of molecule, [8].
The Pearson coefficient, Rp, between the configurational part of the pressure, Pc, and the
potential energy, u, has been used as a convenient measure of the extent to which two
state points are isomorphic [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9]. If the pressure-energy correlation measure,
Rp, is equal to unity, the two states would be completely isomorphic; in reality only IP
fluids form isomorphic lines, so 0 ≤ Rp ≤ 1 for all other model systems having repulsive
and attractive components in their interaction potential. The closer Rp is to unity the
more ‘isomorphic’ the two state points can be said to be.
The statistical analysis of data is carried out in a wide range of disciplines, such as Eco-
nomics, whose experience could be made use of in the branch of statistical physics asso-
ciated with isomorphism. The purpose of the present study is to determine the Pearson
coefficient and related statistical measures of correlation between a variety of thermody-
namic state variables (not just the configurational part of the pressure, Pc, and the total
potential energy per particle, u) by Molecular Dynamics computer simulation. The statis-
tical theoretical framework employed in Economics is made use of here. This examination
elucidates further the nature of near-isomorphic states and by association the factors that
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influence the melting line. Such conclusions might eventually lead to improved perturba-
tion theories of the liquid state.
5.2 SIMULATION AND DEFINITIONS
The Lennard-Jones pair potential was used to generate the molecular configurations re-
ported here. All quantities presented are given in LJ reduced units (i .e.,  for energy, and
σ for distance). The potential energy, pair force and other static properties were obtained
by truncating the LJ potential interactions at a molecule pair separation of r = 2.5 [10].
The usual mean field long range correction formulas, [10] were added to the potential
energy and other static properties. The time step was 0.005/
√
T , where T is the tempera-
ture, and simulations were conducted for up to 106 time steps during the post-equilibration
stage. The number of particles in the simulation cell, N , was 2048, which is large enough
to have minimal finite size effects. Molecular dynamics (MD) simulations were carried out
in the constant temperature ensemble using velocity rescaling. State points on the fluid
side of the melting line terminating at the triple point at ca. T, ρ values of 0.69, 0.85 [11]
were simulated (ρ is the reduced number density or Nσ3/V , where V is the volume of the
cubic simulation cell). The state points simulated were determined via a polynomial fit
to numerous sources of molecular simulation fluid-solid coexistence data taken from the
literature (e.g ., [11, 12]).
Simulations were carried out using different pair potentials to generate the state points,
with some being carried out with the LJ potential. The Weeks-Chandler-Andersen (WCA)
decomposition of the LJ potential into a steeply repulsive (‘r’) and a smoothly varying
(‘background’) attractive (‘a’) part is respectively as follows, [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 13,
22, 20, 19] φWCA,r(r) = φLJ(r) + , r ≤ rc and φWCA,r(r) = 0 r > rc, where rc = 21/6σ
is the position of the minimum of the LJ potential. Also, φWCA,a(r) = −, r ≤ rc and
φWCA,a(r) = φLJ(r) r > rc, so φLJ(r) = φWCA,r(r) + φWCA,a(r) for all r. Some sim-
ulations were carried with φWCA,r(r), and others using the inverse power potential, [23]
φ(r) = 4(σ/r)12 to generate the configurations, for the same values of T and ρ. The
values of the thermodynamic properties of the ‘virtual’ LJ and WCA potential systems
were also computed even for state distributions generated by the other two force fields.
The virial expression for the pressure, P , was used in the simulations, [1, 10]
P =
1
3V
[ N∑
i=1
1
m
p
i
p
i
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
rijfij
]
(5.1)
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where V is the volume of the system, p
i
is the translational momentum of molecule, i, of
mass m, rij = ri − rj , and ri and rj are the coordinates of molecules using the nearest
image, i and j, respectively. The pair force between the molecules is fij = −dφij/drij , ap-
plying the nearest image convention between molecules i and j. The kinetic contribution
to the total pressure is the first term in Eq. (5.1), which by equipartition can be written for
equilibrium systems as P k = ρkBT , where kB is Boltzmann’s constant and ρ = N/V . The
second term on the right hand side of Eq. (5.1), is the configurational part of the pressure,
denoted by Pc. The potential energy per particle is u =<
∑
i<j φ(rij) > /N , where < · · · >
represents a simulation average (the configurational part of the pressure is similarly av-
eraged). For the LJ potential this can be decomposed into repulsive (‘r’) and attractive
(‘a’) parts, i .e., , ur = 4 <
∑
i<j (σ/rij)
12 > /N and ua = −4 <
∑
i<j (σ/rij)
6 > /N ,
respectively. The LJ potential can also be decomposed into the two WCA contribution
parts, uWCA,r =<
∑
i<j φWCA,r(rij) > /N for the WCA repulsive potential component,
and uWCA,a =<
∑
i<j φWCA,a(rij) > /N for the attractive component. In the literature,
the potential term, φWCA,r is often just referred to as the ‘WCA’ potential.
Three temperature and density fluid states along the LJ melting line were considered. The
three temperatures were 0.7, 4.0 and 60, and the corresponding densities were 0.847, 1.229
and 2.289, respectively. The theory of statistical fluctuations relating to linear regression
and the Pearson coefficient is covered in Sec. III. Application of this theory to the simula-
tion data is undergone in Sec. IV. The correlation between Pc and u is computed, as these
two quantities were first used to test for isomorphism in previous molecular simulation
studies [6]. Correlations between two decompositions of the total potential energy are also
assessed. The results from IP and WCA (repulsive part only) and full LJ dynamics are
compared. Section V is mainly concerned with a time-dependent extension of the Pearson
coefficient criterion.
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5.3 THEORY AND RESULTS
In this section the directional relationships between the several variables are analysed.
The analysis of the variance, Pearson’s Rank Correlation Coefficient, [24] which is some-
times referred to as Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation coefficient or PCC for short,
and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression techniques, [25] are used for this purpose.
Pairs of variables are treated and the standard t−test, [26] is carried out to establish the
statistical significance of the derived relationship. The goodness of fit of the correlation
between the variables, for example, uWCA,r and uWCA,a is used to verify to what extent
the relationship between these variables is linear.
Several basic statistical concepts and the relationship between them are covered first, in
order to interpret properly Pearson’s coefficient. One of the most commonly used mea-
sures of how the points in a data set are distributed is the second central moment around
the mean. The ‘variance’ of a variable, A, or σ2A, is the mean squared deviation from its
mean for a given sample of data,
σ2A ≡ V ar(A) = E[(A− E[A])2)] = E[A2]− (E[A])2, (5.2)
where E is the expectation value of A. (i .e., E[A] =
∑N
i=1Ai/N for the i− th value of A
in a data set). The variance measures how spread out about the mean the distribution of
data points is. A variance of zero means all the values of A in a data set have the same
value, and the variance is always ≥ 0, of course. The ‘standard deviation’, denoted by σA,
is the square root of the variance, which in standard notation is,
σA =
√
E[A2]− (E[A])2, (5.3)
which should not be confused here with the particle diameter, σ, in the potential.
A related quantity, the ‘covariance’ is a measure of the ‘strength’ of the linear relationship
between two variables A and B,
Cov(A,B) = E[(A− E[A])(B − E[B])] = E[AB]− E[A]E[B]. (5.4)
If Cov(A,B) > 0, then on averageA increases asB increases and vice versa. If Cov(A,B) <
0, then A tends to decrease as B increases and vice versa. These quantities are important
when it comes to defining the PCC, a widely used measure of the correlation relationship
between the two variables, which is denoted here by, Rp,A,B. Correlation is a measure of
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the directional relationship between the paired elements in two data sets, A and B, and,
Rp,A,B =
Cov(A,B)
σAσB
=
E[(A−A)(B −B)]√
E(A2)− [E(A)]2√E(B2)− [E(B)]2 , (5.5)
where CovA,B is the covariance between data sets A and B, and σA is the standard
deviation of data set A (and the same notation for B). The average value of A is denoted
by A and the average value of B is denoted by B. Note that the PCC is dimensionless while
covariance has units obtained by multiplying the units of the two variables. The PCC is
a measure of the ‘strength’ of the relationship between the two variable sets, but does
not define any particular functional relationship (or ‘causality’) between the two variables
taken at the same time or in a particular order. By ‘causality’ we do not necessarily mean
that a value in A leads directly to the corresponding value in B or vice versa, but that both
quantities may be determined by an underlying third parameter of the system (e.g ., the
partition function of the system in statistical mechanics). This latter point limits our
ability to draw a causal relationship between the two variables, and for this reason an
additional procedure, known as ‘Regression Analysis’, (RA) or in the present context of
assumed proportionality between two variables, ‘Linear Regression’ (LR), which involves
minimising the sum-of-the-squares of the errors is widely used to draw inferences about
any causal relationship between the variables. The RA involves the method of Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS). Below the procedure of regression is defined and used to establish
a formal link between Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the OLS regression coefficient.
Regression analysis is the process of constructing a mathematical model or function that
can be used to predict or determine the value of one variable from that of another variable,
or other variables. The most elementary regression model is called ‘simple regression’. In
simple regression, the variable to be predicted is called the dependent variable, and is
usually designated by Y . The independent variable, or ‘explanatory’ variable, usually
designated by X is also called the ‘predictor’. The procedure of simple regression involves
fitting a straight line through a set of Np points in such a way that the sum of the squared
residuals of the model is minimised. The equation of this line is,
Yˆi = βˆ0 + βˆ1Xi, (5.6)
where, Yˆi is the predicted value of Yi using a finite number of sample sets, βˆ0 is the y-
intercept of the line of best fit, and βˆ1 is the slope of the line of best fit. The difference
between the actual and predicted value of the dependent variable, called the ‘residual’, is,
Uˆi = Yi − Yˆi = Yi − βˆ0 − βˆ1Xi. (5.7)
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The residuals are the vertical distances between the points of the data set and the fitted
line. Intuitively it is readily appreciated that the smaller the residuals the closer the fit
line is to the distribution of input pair values. To avoid the problem of positive residuals
offsetting negative residuals, the principle of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is employed,
which involves finding the values of βˆ0 and βˆ1 which minimise the sum of the squares of
the residuals, S,
S =
Np∑
i=1
Uˆ2i =
Np∑
i=1
(Yi − Yˆi)2 =
Np∑
i=1
(Yi − βˆ0 − βˆ1Xi)2. (5.8)
By minimising the above equation with respect to βˆ0 (intercept) and βˆ1 (slope) expressions
for these two quantities are obtained,
βˆ0 = Y − βˆ1X, (5.9)
where βˆ0 is the predicted intercept, and the predicted slope, βˆ1 is,
βˆ1 =
E[(X −X)(Y − Y )]
E(X2)− [E(X)]2 =
Cov(X,Y )
V ar(X)
, (5.10)
for Np data points, and where, X is the mean value of the explanatory variable X, and Y
is the mean value of the dependent variable, Y .
The relationship between the OLS estimator and Pearson’s Correlation coefficient is now
derived. The formula for the estimator, βˆ1, is given by,
βˆ1 =
Cov(A,B)
σ2B
=
E[(A−A)(B −B)]
E(B2)− [E(B)]2 . (5.11)
The relationship between the PCC and the OLS estimator, βˆ1, is then,
βˆ1 =
E[(A−A)(B −B)]
E(B2)− [E(B)]2
=
E[(A−A)(B −B)]√
E(A2)− [E(A)]2√E(B2)− [E(B)]2
√
E(A2)− [E(A)]2√
E(B2)− [E(B)]2
= Rp,A,B
σA
σB
, (5.12)
which reveals that the regresssion coefficient is Pearson’s correlation coefficient times the
ratio of the standard deviations of the independent variable divided by that of the depen-
dent variable. This signifies that regression analysis provides additional information when
compared to the Pearson coefficient, namely, the relative distribution spreads of the two
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variables. The OLS coefficient, βˆ1, will be used here to analyze the relationship between
the two variables, in addition to the PCC. Equation (5.12) also proves that the sign of
Pearson’s correlation coefficient and that of the OLS coefficient are the same, as σA ≥ 0
and σB ≥ 0. To establish how well the predicted line fits the data, the ratio,
R2 =
V ar(Yˆ )
V ar(Y )
, (5.13)
is used, where R2 measures the fractional variation in the dependent variable given by the
model. The predicted value of Y is Yˆ , and the input value of the treatment is Y .
The so-called t-test, [27] is used here to establish whether the OLS estimator is significantly
different from zero, (i .e., the slope is statistically significant based on the number and
distribution of data points) through the parameter, t,
t =
βˆ1
s.e.(βˆ1)
(5.14)
where s.e.(βˆ1) is the standard error of βˆ1.
The above analysis is now used to establish the extent of correlation between the following
pairs of variables, (u, Pc), (ur, ua) and (uWCA,r, uWCA,a) where the right entry is taken
to be the dependent variable and the left entry to be the independent variable. In the
latter two sets it is reasonable to take the repulsive energy term to be the independent
variable as this is consistent with perturbation theories of liquids where the structure of
the liquid is assumed to be dominated by the repulsive part of the potential. For (u, Pc)
there appears to be no clear preference for which of the quantities should be taken to be
the independent variable as they are formally different system measures, and both include
the repulsive and attractive parts of the potential energy (although weighted differently).
The adopted choice is therefore arbitrary.
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5.4 REGRESSION AND CORRELATION
The linear regression and Pearson coefficient as defined in Fig. (5.5) are first explored for
system states generated using the LJ potential for three state points in the low and high
temperature limits, and one in the middle.
Figure 1 shows (a) Pc as a function of u, (b) ua as a function of ur and and (c) uWCA,a as a
function of uWCA,r respectively from left to right. The state point used has a temperature
of 60 and a density of 2.289 in LJ reduced units. The degree of correlation is measured by
the extent to which the data points fall on or near the regression straight line. Figures 2
and 3 give the corresponding plots for the temperature, density pairs of (4.00, 1.229) and
(0.70, 0.847), respectively. These three state points are on the fluid boundary side of the
LJ melting line. The dynamics and state points are generated using the LJ potential.
Tables 1-9 give a further statistical analysis of these nine data sets, with specific conclu-
sions for each case made in the figure caption. A number of noteworthy points emerge
from this analysis. Of the three sets, the (u, Pc) correlations are strongest, and have a
positive slope. The extent of linearity in the correlation between this pair has been used
to determine the extent to which lines on the density-temperature planes of the phase
diagram are isomorphic (i .e., have an underlying structural invariance),[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. The
ur and ua are also quite strongly linked but with a negative slope, which indicates that
they are anticorrelated. Even at constant temperature, one expects the attractive part
of the potential to change in the opposite direction to a change in the repulsive part, as
it would do exactly in the microcanonical or NVE ensemble. Both of these trends are
evident along the whole of the melting line.
The behaviour of the uWCA,a, uWCA,r pair, in contrast, changes qualitatively along the
melting line. The slope goes from being negative to positive as the temperature (density)
decreases, and is approximately infinite in the region, T ∼ 10. This change in behaviour
has to be associated with the analytic form of the repulsive and attractive parts of the
WCA decomposition of the LJ potential, and the dynamic distribution of near neighbour
molecules. As the (temperature) density decreases the near neighbour particles move fur-
ther apart, and the repulsive part of the potential is weaker. This must surely weaken the
anticorrelation coupling between φWCA,r and φWCA,a energy terms. In fact it becomes
slightly correlated close to the triple point.
The radial distribution function for the three fluid state points generated using the LJ
potential force field are shown in Fig. 4. The lower set of curves uses the pair separation,
r in LJ σ on the abscissa. The top set of radial distribution functions expressed in iso-
morphic distance units, r˜ = ρ1/3r, show excellent isomorphic collapse. The peaks of g(r)
shift to smaller distances with increasing density. In fact, the first peak of all three are to
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varying extents within the truncation distance of φWCA,r i .e., rc = 2
1/6, which is shown
as a vertical line on the figure. For T = 60 the whole of the first peak is within rc while
only half of it is in this range for T = 0.7. The correlation to anticorrelation transition
must surely by attributable to these variations, or more many-body consequences of these
trends.
The analysis used to generate Figs. 1-3 was made for systems generated by the LJ poten-
tial. Two purely repulsive potentials, which are formed from the repulsive region of the
LJ potential are now considered as origins of the system dynamics. One form, called here,
‘IP12’, is the IP potential with n = 12, i .e., φ(r) = 4(σ/r)12, which does not include
any of the attractive part of the LJ potential. The other purely repulsive potential is the
repulsive part of the LJ or WCA interaction, φWCA,r, which does include the short range
region of the attractive part of the LJ potential, up to rc. The potential (or derived force)
used to generate the system of states is referred to as the ‘force field’ here. The results of
these simulations are summarised in Figs. 5-7, and in Table 10.
Figure 5 compares the same three pairs of computed property as in Figs. 1-3, given along
the rows. Each row is a different force field. The bottom row is derived from LJ potential
dynamics. The middle row used the (repulsive) WCA force field, and the top row from the
IP12 potential. The temperature and density of the state point are 0.70 and 0.847 for each
of the nine frames. First, the figure shows that the WCA and IP12 potentials generate
very similar pair-property correlation behaviour to the LJ case. The ur and ua are strongly
anticorrelated more or less equally for the three force fields. The figure also indicates that
the uWCA,r, uWCA,a pair are relatively weakly correlated, especially for IP12, indicated by
the ellipsoidal pattern of symbols on the figure (top right frame). This weak correlation
trend is understandable as the WCA decomposition of the LJ potential was originally
chosen to partition it into a strongly repulsive part and a slowly varying component which
is weakly correlated with the repulsive decomposition part (acting almost as an ‘attractive
background’), for use in perturbation theories of the liquid state, [13, 28, 29, 30]. In the
perturbation theory the attractive part of the WCA potential is treated as a background
term and the structure is governed by the repulsive part of the WCA decomposition.
Figure 6 presents the same set of correlations for a state point in which the temperature
and density are 4.00 and 1.229, repectively. The ur, ua pair are again strongly anticorre-
lated for all force fields. The uWCA,r, uWCA,a pair are even more weakly correlated than in
Fig. 5, for all force fields, as evident by the nearly circular pattern of symbols for all frames
in the rightmost column. Superficially at least it appears that the two potential terms are
statistically independent, which could be made use of in developing perturbation theories
of the liquid state, as these two components appear to be statistically independent over a
certain temperature (density) range along the melting curve. Another noteworthy feature
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is that again the distribution of points for each type of correlation is largely independent
of the dynamics generating force field, along the melting line at least.
Figure 7 presents the corresponding data for a temperature of 60 and density of 2.289. The
three ur and ua are anticorrelated to more or less the same extent as found in the previous
two figures. The three uWCA,r, uWCA,a pair reveal strong anticorrelation this time. This
change in behavior could be explained because the repulsive part of the potential becomes
relatively more important at higher temperatures (density), and larger fluctuations in this
part of the potential energy will take place which will induce oppositely signed fluctuations
in the attractive part of the potential (i .e., the constant temperature system is not too far
from the microcanonical ensemble in this limit). As discussed above, a key issue in this
respect is probably where the first peak in the radial distribution function lies in relation
to the minimum in the radial distribution function.
Table 10 gives a summary of the simulation average property values for the three state
points considered in Figs. 5-7, which are well separated along the melting line. The table
shows that as temperature (density) increases the total LJ potential energy, u, shifts in
the positive direction, especially for simulations carried out with the IP potential using
n = 12 (or ‘IP12’) force field dynamics. The difference in the total energy from LJ and
WCA dynamics is insignificant at T = 60 and not very great for T = 0.7, a result which is
consistent with the aim of using the WCA potential in perturbation theory. The average
potential energy, u, values from the LJ and WCA dynamics are not too different, and
typically within a few percent of each other, while that of the IP12 force field is much more
positive, which becomes more accentuated with increasing temperature along the melting
curve. The PCC for the three pairs of quantities are shown in the last three columns of
the table, which shows that the Pearson coefficient for the Pc and u pair of quantities is
very close to unity for all of the state points considered. Its value increases towards unity
with increasing temperature. Just why the Pearson Coefficient is so close to unity for this
pair of system quantities is not immediately obvious. One might expect there to be a
reasonably strong correlation between u and Pc as the latter has a component of ur in its
definition. In fact, for the Lennard-Jones potential, Pc/ρT = 4ur + 2ua, [31] Indeed, all
static properties of the LJ system can be expressed as a linear combination of the average
repulsive and attractive parts of the potential, apart from some known constants or nu-
merical factors. The strong anticorrelation between ur and ua may also contribute to the
proximity of the PCC to unity, as then the repulsive and attractive terms can be combined
into one effective (less repulsive) quantity. The table shows that the quantity, Rp[ur.ua],
is close to −1 for the three state points. The behaviour in Rp for the pair, uWCA,r with
uWCA,a, is quite different, as noted above. The absolute value is much less than unity and
for all types of force field dynamics; it is sensitive to state point and Rp goes from positive
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to negative in the temperature interval between 4 and 60. At higher temperature there is
evident more anticorrelation between the positive and attractive parts of the potential.
A limitation of linear regression and the Pearson coefficient is that it does not give any
indication of the time or chronological persistence of the correlation between the two quan-
tities along the data set. In fact, any randomly sorted array of a two column table would
give the same scatter plots and PCC values. However consecutive data values in a table
can be correlated with each other, which generally decays to a statistically uncorrelated
state between two data points far enough along the table. This is useful information
which can give further insights into the underlying physics. An extension of the Pearson
correlation concept which gives this additional information is proposed and tested in the
next section.
5.5 Time correlation Pearson Modification
The degree of correlation between the same or two different quantities at times separated
by an interval, t, can be expressed as,
Rp,A,B(t) =
< δA(0)δB(t) >
< δA(0)2 >1/2< δB(0)2 >1/2
. (5.15)
where A and B are again the two system quantities of interest. In Eq. (5.15) the quantity,
δA(t) = A(t) − A and δB(t) = B(t) − B. The function in Eq. (5.15) is an extension
of the Pearson coefficient definition (which is the t = 0 value) to account for temporal
correlations between the two quantities. Such a formula is widely used in economics and
is known as regression with n−lagged explanatory variable [25]. In liquid state physics,
if A = B then this is called an ‘autocorrelation’ function whereas if A 6= B it is referred
to as a ‘cross-correlation or perhaps ‘Pearson’ correlation function in the present context.
The quantity defined in Eq. (5.15) is closely related to the time-correlation function used
to explore the dynamics and calculate transport coefficients of fluids by MD with Green-
Kubo formulae, [32] but in that case the denominator is set to < δA(0)δB(0) > or unity
(respectively) instead. The only significant difference is the normalisation factor used
in the denominator. An informative step in the present context is to express time in
isomorphic units defined by, t˜ = ρ1/3T 1/2t. Along an isomorphic line time dependent
properties scale with time expressed as t˜. Time dependent properties along an isomorph
should collapse onto the same curve if the ordinate quantity is suitably normalised (this is
referred to as isochronal scaling). The time-dependent function, Rp,A,B(t˜) from Eq. (5.15)
expressed in terms of isomorphic time quantifies the time persistence of any correlation
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between A and B over time, t. It gives some information on how long it takes the correlated
values between two variables to become statistically uncorrelated to a strong degree.
The above treatment is another statistical analysis tool which quantifies the relationship
between variables, where an explanatory variable can influence the dependent variable even
with a time lag. These are known as distributed lag models in the time series literature,
and which are formulated as follows,
Yt = β0 + β1Xt−1 + Ut (5.16)
where Yt is the functional value at time t for the input vector, Xt−1 and β1 measures
the effect of the explanatory variable one increment of time in the past to the dependent
variable, ceteris paribus. The residual vector at time t is denoted by Ut. Many lagged
variables t − 1, t − 2, · · · as far back as necessary may need to be included in the set of
explanatory variables to account fully for memory effects. The extent of the time lag can
be chosen by using t−tests for every subsequent addition of a lagged explanatory variable.
The OLS estimation gives the best fit to the data, the statistical significance of which can
be established using the t−test and other statistical measures to prove the data is station-
ary, that is when the mean, variance, autocorrelation of the data are constant within the
data statistics.
Figure 8 shows Rp,A,B(t˜) for the same fluid state points and quantities as given in Table I,
where the LJ force field has been used to generate the dynamics. The three Pearson
cross-correlation functions shown on the figure are, < u(0)Pc(t˜) >, < ur(0)ua(t˜) > and
< ur,WCA(0)ua,WCA(t˜) >. The first two functions decay monotonically to zero from a
positive or negative initial value, and to a very good approximation exhibit isochronal
collapse along the studied melting line. The corresponding WCA quantity has a quite dif-
ferent time dependence even when cast in isomorphic units, which is consistent with the
data in Table I (i .e., the time equal to zero value of this function). The t = 0 value goes
from being positive to negative with increasing temperature, and at a certain temperature
Rp,A,B(0) is zero for each type of dynamics. Simulations carried out at that state point
could therefore be useful in informing the development of perturbation theory descriptions
of the liquid state. There is a long-time tail in these functions, having not achieved zero
by 0.5 isomorphic time units. Figures 9 and 10 show the corresponding Rp(t˜) produced
by WCA and IP12 forcefield dynamics. The correlation functions decay more rapidly to
zero for WCA (by t˜ = 0.4) and especially IP12 (by t˜ = 0.2). Otherwise the features and
trends are qualitatively the same as for LJ dynamics as shown in Fig. 8.
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS
The statistical fluctuation behaviour of pairs of thermodynamic properties are examined
for the Lennard-Jones (LJ) fluid along its melting curve. Plots of the instantaneous values
of the two variables (‘scatter plots’) are used to determine the slope and intercept using
standard linear regression analysis. The Pearson coefficient was also calculated, which
has been used recently to determine the extent to which a line on the phase diagram
is isomorphic (i .e., has an underlying structural invariance) taking the two variables to
be the configurational part of the pressure and the potential energy of the system. The
statistical analysis has been extended here to include that between the repulsive and at-
tractive parts of the LJ potential, and also that of its Weeks-Chandler-Andersen (WCA)
decomposition. At constant temperature, the former are strongly anticorrelated along the
melting line whereas the latter go from being weakly correlated near the triple point to
being moderately anticorrelated in the high temperature (density) limit.
The present analysis approach gives new insights into the relative roles of the attractive
and repulsive parts of the LJ potential in determining its structure and thermodynamic
properties, and could perhaps be used to help develop perturbation theories of the liquid
state.
The statistical theoretical framework found useful in Economics is exploited here, and
an extension of the Pearson coefficient method to determine time dependent correlations
is also proposed, and shown to give new insights into the temporal behaviour of system
property correlations.
The statistical trends are shown to be relatively insensitive to the potential used to gen-
erate the dynamics if it is purely repulsive and constructed from the LJ potential either
as the r−12 inverse power part or the repulsive part of the WCA reconstruction of the LJ
potential.
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5.7 Tables and Figures
Pc Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
β1 0.9321 0.03682 25.31 0.000 0.8595 - 1.004718
β0 0.01063 0.01684 0.63 0.529 -0.02257 - 0.04383
R2 = 0.7639, Np = 200
Table 5.1: Linear single variable OLS regression of the u and Pc data for the state point
values of T, ρ equal to 0.7, 0.8468, respectively. The top left hand entry is the independent
variable, which is Pc for this table. Np is the number of data point pairs. The above
regression produces, βˆ0 = 0.01063 and βˆ1 = 0.9321. The p value on βˆ0 is greater than
0.05, hence βˆ0 is not a significant predictor of the real y-intercept. The p value on βˆ1 does
not exceed 0.05, and therefore Pc is a significant predictor of u, as Pc increases by one unit
u increases by 0.93 units. The value of R2 tells us that variation in Pc explains 76.39%
of the variation in u. The t−test value is denoted by ‘t’ in the table heading. ‘Conf.
Interval’ is the confidence interval. The statistical analysis carried out for this table and
tables II-IX was carried out using the statistical analysis software package, c© STATA [33].
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ua Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 -0.9174 0.02348 -39.08 0.000 -0.9636 - 0.8711
βˆ0 0.9579 0.01334 71.79 0.000 0.9316 - 0.9843
R2 = 0.8852, Np = 200
Table 5.2: Linear single variable OLS regression of the ur and ua data for the state point,
T, ρ equal to 0.7, 0.8468. Both βˆ0 and βˆ1 are significant predictors of the real intercept
and slope respectively. As ua increases by one unit ur decreases by 0.92 units and when
the value of ua is equal to zero ur equals 0.96. The variation in ua explains 88.52% of the
variation in ur.
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uWCA,a Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 0.5565 0.05852 9.51 0.000 0.4410 - 0.6719
βˆ0 0.1188 0.03020 3.93 0.000 0.05927 - 0.17837
R2 = 0.3135, Np = 200
Table 5.3: Linear single variable OLS regression of the uWCA,r and uWCA,a data for T, ρ
equal to 0.7, 0.8468. Both βˆ0 and βˆ1 are significant predictors of the real intercept and
slope respectively. As uWCA,a increases by one unit uWCA,r increases by 0.56 units and
when the value of uWCA,a equals zero, uWCA,r is equal to 0.12. The variation in uWCA,a
explains 31.35% of the variation in uWCA,r.
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Pc Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 1.001 0.00483 207.3 0.000 0.9917 - 1.011
βˆ0 0.0004956 0.00246 0.20 0.840 -0.004354 - 0.005345
R2 = 0.9954, Np = 200
Table 5.4: Linear single variable OLS regression of the u and Pc data for T, ρ equal to
4.0, 1.229. The p value on βˆ0 is greater than 0.05 hence βˆ0 is not a significant predictor
of the real y-intercept. The p value on βˆ1 does not exeed 0.05, and therefore Pc is a
significant predictor of u, as when Pc increases by one unit, u increases by 1.0 units. The
value of R2 informs us that variation in Pc contributes 99.54% of the variation in u.
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ua Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 -0.8965 0.02223 -40.33 0.000 -0.9403 - 0.8526
βˆ0 0.9448 0.01155 81.77 0.000 0.9220 - 0.9676
R2 = 0.8915, Np = 200
Table 5.5: Linear single variable OLS regression of the ur and ua data for T, ρ equal
to 4.0, 1.229. Both βˆ0 and βˆ1 are significant predictors of the real intercept and slope
respectively. As ua increases by one unit ur decreases by 0.90 units and when the value
of ua equals zero ur equals 0.94. Variation in ua explains 89.15% variation in ur.
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uWCA,a Coefficient Std. Error t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 0.2885 0.06280 4.59 0.000 0.1647 - 0.4124
βˆ0 0.3402 0.03407 9.99 0.000 0.2730 - 0.4074
R2 = 0.0963, Np = 200
Table 5.6: Linear single variable OLS regression of the uWCA,r and uWCA,a data for T, ρ
equal to 4.0, 1.229. Both βˆ0 and βˆ1 are significant predictors of the real intercept and
slope respectively. As uWCA,a increases by one unit, uWCA,r increases by 0.29 units and
when the value of uWCA,a equals zero uWCA,r equals 0.34. Variation in uWCA,a explains
9.63% of the variation in uWCA,r.
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Pc Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 0.9992 0.0011964 835.19 0.000 0.9968 - 1.002
βˆ0 -9.72× 10−6 0.0005778 -0.02 0.987 -0.001149 - 0.001130
R2 = 0.9997, Np = 200
Table 5.7: Linear single variable OLS regression of the u and Pc data for T, ρ equal to
60.0, 2.289. The p value on βˆ0 is greater than 0.05, hence βˆ0 is not a significant predictor
of the real y-intercept. The p value on βˆ1 does not exeed 0.05, therefore Pc is a significant
predictor of u, as Pc increases by one unit u also increases by 1.0 units. The value of R
2
indicates that the variation in Pc explains 99.97% of variation in u.
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ua Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 -0.8013 0.03259 -24.59 0.000 -0.8655 - 0.7370
βˆ0 0.8856 0.01782 49.70 0.000 0.8504 - 0.9207
R2 = 0.7533, Np = 200
Table 5.8: Linear single variable OLS regression of the ur and ua data for T, ρ equal
to 60.0, 2.289. Both βˆ0 and βˆ1 are significant predictors of the real intercept and slope,
respectively. As ua increases by one unit, ur decreases by 0.80 units. When the value of
ua equals zero ur equals 0.88. Variation in ua explains 75.33% variation in ur.
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uWCA,a Coefficient Std. Error t p > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
βˆ1 -0.5398 0.06052 -8.92 0.000 -0.6591 - 0.4204
βˆ0 0.7041 0.02827 24.91 0.000 0.64839 - 0.7599
R2 = 0.2866, Np = 200
Table 5.9: Linear single variable OLS regression of the uWCA,r and uWCA,a data for T, ρ
equal to 60.0, 2.289. Both βˆ0 and βˆ1 are significant predictors of the real intercept and
slope respectively. As uWCA,a increases by one unit uWCA,r, decreases by 0.54 units.
When the value of uWCA,a equals zero uWCA,r equals 0.70. Variation in uWCA,a explains
28.66% of the variation in uWCA,r.
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Dynamics T ρ ur ua u uWCA,r uWCA,a Pcu urua uWCA,ruWCA,a
IP12 0.7 0.847 11.67 -14.03 -2.35 4.11 -6.46 0.995 -0.930 0.425
LJ 0.7 0.847 5.80 -11.94 -6.13 0.601 -6.74 0.959 -0.944 0.537
WCA 0.7 0.847 6.10 -12.06 -5.96 0.712 -6.67 0.972 -0.949 0.603
IP12 4 1.230 58.43 -30.48 27.94 37.27 -9.33 0.999 -0.926 0.151
LJ 4 1.230 24.27 -24.62 -0.349 9.12 -9.46 0.998 -0.951 0.335
WCA 4 1.230 24.39 -24.66 -0.265 9.19 -9.46 0.998 -0.952 0.344
IP12 60 2.289 781.7 -108.67 673.01 690.53 -17.53 1.000 -0.920 -0.298
LJ 60 2.289 293.6 -85.39 208.17 225.43 -17.25 1.000 -0.951 -0.571
WCA 60 2.289 293.4 -85.38 208.02 225.27 -17.25 1.000 -0.952 -0.580
Table 5.10: Thermodynamic averages and the Pearson coefficient, Rp, for three fluid state
points the configurations of which are generated according to three force fields specified
in the first column. Note that u = ur + ua = uWCA,r + uWCA,a. The acronym, ‘IP12’
indicates dynamics generated using the IP potential with n = 12. The acronym ‘WCA’
indicates that the MD dynamics were produced using the repulsive part of the LJ potential,
i .e., φWCA,r. The Rp values for three quantity correlations are given in the last three
columns.
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Figure 5.1: The correlation from left to right (a) Pc as a function of u (b) ua as a function of
ur and (c) uWCA,a as a function of uWCA,r where the quantities plotted are the differences
from their means. The state point is T = 60.00 and ρ = 2.289, using the LJ potential to
generate the dynamics, which is high up on the melting curve. The data in each frame is
normalised to fall within 0−1 for the abscissa and ordinate quantities. The solid lines are
least square fits to the data.
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Figure 5.2: As for Fig. 1 except that the state point is T = 4.00 and ρ = 1.229 is used.
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Figure 5.3: As for Fig. 1 except that the state point is T = 0.700 and ρ = 0.847 is used.
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Figure 5.4: The radial distribution function, g(r) expressed in LJ distance units, and in
isomorphic distance units, r˜ = ρ1/3r for the three state points along the fluid side of the
coexistence curve. The upper set curves, shifted upwards by 3 is g(r˜) and the lower set
are g(r). The LJ potential is also shown. The vertical line corresponding to the position
of the minimum in φLJ(r), which is equal to 2
1/6, is shown.
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Figure 5.5: The correlation between (from left to right columns, respectively), (a) LJ
u and Pc, (b) LJ ur and ua and (c) uWCA,r and uWCA,a where the quantities are the
differences from their means. The rows indicate from bottom to top, (a) LJ, (b) WCA
and (c) IP12 force field dynamics. The near-triple point state point of T = 0.70 and
ρ = 0.847 is considered. The data in each frame is normalised to fall within 0− 1 for the
abscissa and ordinate quantities.
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Figure 5.6: As for Fig. 5, except the state point T = 4.00 and ρ = 1.229 is considered.
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Figure 5.7: As for Fig. 5, except the state point T = 60.0 and ρ = 2.289 is considered.
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Figure 5.8: The function, Rp(t˜) defined in Eq. (5.15) is plotted for three cross-
correlations, < u(0)Pc(t˜) > and < ur(0)ua(t˜) > using the LJ potential terms, and
< ur,WCA(0)ua,WCA(t˜) >. The LJ potential was used in each case to calculate the forces
used in the equations of motion. For each quantity the difference from the mean is used.
Data for the fluid phase ML state points, [60.00, 2.289], [4.00, 1.229] and [0.70, 0.847], are
considered, and which are in the same order from bottom to top on the figure in the WCA
case.
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Figure 5.9: As for Fig. 8 except that WCA potential was used in each case to generate
the dynamics.
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Figure 5.10: As for Fig. 8 except that IP potential with n = 12 (‘IP12’) was used for the
dynamics.
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